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THE SLOW-BURNING GENOCIDE OF MYANMAR’S 
ROHINGYA 
Maung Zarni† and Alice Cowley† 
Abstract:  Since 1978, the Rohingya, a Muslim minority of Western Burma, 
have been subject to a state-sponsored process of destruction.  The Rohingya have deep 
historical roots in the borderlands of Rakhine State, Myanmar, and were recognized 
officially both as citizens and as an ethnic group by three successive governments of 
post-independence Burma.  In 1978, General Ne Win’s socialist military dictatorship 
launched the first large-scale campaign against the Rohingya in Rakhine State with the 
intent first of expelling them en masse from Western Burma and subsequently 
legalizing the systematic erasure of Rohingya group identity and legitimizing their 
physical destruction.  This on-going process has continued to the present day under the 
civilian-military rule of President Thein Sein’s government.  Since 2012, the Rohingya 
have been subject to renewed waves of hate campaigns and accompanying violence, 
killings and ostracization that aim both to destroy the Rohingya and to permanently 
remove them from their ancestral homes in Rakhine State.  
Findings from the authors’ three-year research on the plight of the Rohingya lead 
us to conclude that Rohingya have been subject to a process of slow-burning genocide 
over the past thirty-five years.  The destruction of the Rohingya is carried out both by 
civilian populations backed by the state and perpetrated directly by state actors and 
state institutions.  Both the State in Burma and the local community have committed 
four out of five acts of genocide as spelled out by the 1948 Convention on the 
Punishment and Prevention of the Crime of Genocide.  Despite growing evidence of 
genocide, the international community has so far avoided calling this large scale human 
suffering genocide because no powerful member states of the UN Security Council 
have any appetite to forego their commercial and strategic interests in Burma to 
address the slow-burning Rohingya genocide.    
                                                      
† An International Judge, People’s Tribunal on Sri Lanka, Germany (2013); Fellow, Center of 
Democracy and Elections, the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur; and Visiting Fellow (2013-15), 
Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit, London School of Economics, Zarni was born, lived 
and university-educated in Mandalay, Burma, from 1963—1988.  He never met a single Rohingya 
throughout the course of his life in Burma.  Further as an indication of the effectiveness of the anti-
Rohingya policies and propaganda adopted by successive Myanmar military governments he had not 
even heard of the word Rohingya while living in the country.  He was introduced to the issue of 
Rohingya persecution by his colleague Alice Cowley only about 4 years ago, and came to accept the 
Rohingya as one of his own fellow Myanmar peoples based on the strength of the empirical evidence.  
Outraged by the level of atrocities committed against the Rohingya in the name of Myanmar people and 
religion, he has been using his scholarship in order to quell myths and rumors detrimental to the 
Rohingya well-being.  Zarni holds a PhD from the University of Wisconsin at Madison and MA from the 
University of California at Davis.  
† Consultant Researcher, Equal Rights Trust (ERT), London.  Alice Cowley, BA First Class 
(School of Oriental and African Studies or SOAS) and MA with distinction (Institute of Education), both 
at the University of London, has worked with various refugees from Myanmar since 2000.  In the early 
2000’s, she lived and worked as a teacher in a Karenni refugee camp along the Thai-Burmese border and 
became aware of Myanmar’s persecution of the Rohingya and the anti-Rohingya ethnic nationalism 
among the Rakhine political refugees.  No sooner had she joined the ERT’s Statelessness and Nationality 
Project in 2009 than she began researching about the persecution of the Rohingya.  Both researchers have 
since worked with Rohingya refugees in various capacities and at different levels of the Rohingya issues 
in London, Bangkok, and Kuala Lumpur.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
“What can we do, Brother, they (the Rohingya) are too many?  
We can’t kill them all.” Ex-Brigadier General, formerly 
stationed in Arakan or Rakhine State, and Ambassador to 
Brunei, Fall, 2012.1 
 
“How can it be ethnic cleansing?  They are not an ethnic 
group.” Mr. Win Myaing, the official spokesperson of the 
Rakhine State Government, May 15, 2013.2  
 
“We do not have the term ‘Rohingya.’”  Myanmar President 
Thein Sein, Chatham House, London, July 17, 2013.3 
 
“There are elements of genocide in Rakhine with respect to 
Rohingya . . . . The possibility of a genocide needs to be 
discussed.  I myself do not use the term genocide for strategic 
reasons.”  Tomás Ojéa Quintana, United Nations Special 
Rapporteur for Human Rights, London Conference on 
Decades of State-Sponsored Destruction of Myanmar’s 
Rohingya, April 28, 2014.4 
 
Over the past thirty-five years, the State in Myanmar has 
intentionally formulated, pursued, and executed national and state-level 
plans aimed at destroying the Rohingya people in Western Myanmar. 5   
This destruction has been state-sponsored, legalized, and initiated by a 
frontal assault on the identity, culture, social foundation, and history of the 
Rohingya who are a people with a distinct ethnic culture.  They are a 
borderland people whose ancestral roots and cultural ties lie along the post-
colonial borders of today’s Myanmar, a former British colony until its 
                                                      
1  Interview with Thet Oo Maung, Ex-Brigadier Gen. and Ambassador to Brunei, in Brunei (Aug. 
2012).  
2  Jason Szep, Special Report - In Myanmar, Apartheid Tactics Against Minority Muslims, 
REUTERS, May 15, 2013,  http://mobile.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSBRE94E00020130515?i=3& 
irpc=932.  Mr Win Myaing is a Buddhist Rakhine official spokesperson of Rakhine State Government.  
Id.     
3  Mark Inkey, Thein Sein Talks at Chatham House, NEW MANDALA, July 17, 2013, 
http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2013/07/17/thein-sein-talks-at-chatham-house/.  
4  Maung Zarni, Press Release: United Nations Expert Says There Are “Elements of Genocide” 
Against Myanmar’s Rohingya, ZARNI’S BLOG (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.maungzarni.net/2014/04/ 
press-release-united-nations-expert.html#sthash.AFAEnbbr.dpuf (last visited May 24, 2014). 
5  David Mepham, Dispatches: Burma – “Excuse Me, Mr. President . . .”,  HUM. RTS. WATCH, 
July 19, 2013, http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/19/excuse-me-mr-president.  
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independence in 1948, and Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, which 
gained its independence from Pakistan in 1971.  Their identity as an ethno-
linguistic group was recognized under successive Burmese regimes after 
independence in 1948 and was systematically erased by the increasingly 
anti-Muslim military-controlled governments since 1962.6  In Myanmar’s 
state media, official policy documents, and school textbooks, the Rohingya 
are referred to as Bengali, a racist local reference, and are portrayed as 
illegal economic migrants from the colonial time, who are a  ‘threat to 
national security, a portrayal that the bulk of the Burmese have accepted as 
a fact over the past five decades.  In contrast, the international community 
continues to recognize the Rohingya as an ethnic group.7  The State and the 
predominantly Buddhist society have collaborated with the intent to de-
indigenize, illegalize, dehumanize, and destroy a people whose ancestral 
home is in Myanmar.  The evidence of the intent to destroy the Rohingya 
people over the past thirty-five years through assaults on their identity, 
killings during multiple pogroms, physical and mental harm, deliberate 
infliction of conditions of life designed to bring about the group’s 
destruction, and measures to prevent births, lead the authors to conclude 
that Myanmar’s Rohingya are the victims of genocide carried out jointly 
by the central political state and anti-Muslim ultra-nationalists among the 
Buddhist Rakhine peoples.   
Rohingya is an ethno-religious term meaning Muslim people whose 
ancestral home is Arakan or Rakhine in Myanmar.8   To date, the total 
number of Rohingya in Rakhine State are estimated at over one million, 
the majority of whom live in three townships of North Rakhine State, and 
                                                      
6  For an on-line selection of fully authenticated ID cards and other proofs of the Rohingya 
existence, identity and citizenship in Burma or Myanmar, see Maung Zarni, The Official Evidence of the 
Rohingya Ethnic ID and Citizenship which the Burmese Ethno- and Genocidists Don’t Want You to See, 
ZARNI’S BLOG, http://www.maungzarni.net/2012/08/the-official-evidence-of-rohingya.html.  
7  For instance, international visitors to the country—including the veteran anti-apartheid 
campaigner of South Africa Desmond Tutu, U.S. President Barack Obama, Britain’s Speaker of the 
House of Commons John Bercow and so on—have all referred to the Rohingya as “Rohingya.”  As a 
matter of fact, in his public lecture at Rangoon University on August 1, 2012, MP John Bercow stated 
emphatically that to call the Rohingya “Bengali” is mentally “hurtful” to the Rohingya and amounts to 
“racism.”  For Bercow’s lecture see Shwe Maung, Q&A-Speaker of The House of Commons in Yangon, 
YOUTUBE (Aug. 2, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zUNI_ngFAqI.  For the transcript of 
President Obama’s speech at Rangoon University, see Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by 
President Obama at the University of Yangon (Nov. 19, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
the-press-office/2012/11/19/remarks-president-obama-university-yangon.  
8   Michael W. Charney, Buddhism in Arakan: Theories and Historiography of the Religious Basis 
of Ethnonyms, KALABAN PRESS NETWORK, July 8, 2007, http://www.kaladanpress.org/index.php/ 
scholar-column-mainmenu-36/58-arakan-historical-seminar/718-buddhism-in-arakantheories-and-
historiography-of-the-religious-basis-of-ethnonyms.  
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the vast majority of whom are stateless.9  Since the violence of 2012, over 
140,000 people remain displaced in seventy-six camps and camp-like 
settings across Rakhine State, the bulk of which are Rohingya and other 
Muslim minorities from Rakhine State.10  Roughly 36,000 Rohingya and 
other Muslims in communities across Rakhine State are considered by the 
United Nations (“UN”) to be acutely vulnerable and in need of urgent 
humanitarian assistance.11  
Genocide is defined by Article 2 of the 1948 Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: 
 
[A]ny of the following acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) 
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of 
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole 
or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births 
within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the 
group to another group.12   
 
The authors frame the Rohingya genocide in Myanmar, within the first 
four acts of this definition, with a focus on the intention of both the State 
and the non-state actors in society to bring about the destruction of the 
Rohingya as an ethno-religious group. 
 This article characterizes the human rights abuses against the 
Rohingya as a slow-burning genocide—that is, one that has taken place 
over the past thirty-five years and continues today via similar processes 
                                                      
9  Jason Szep & Andrew R.C. Marshall, Myanmar Minister Backs Two-child Policy For Rohingya 
Minority, REUTERS, Jun. 11, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/11/us-myanmar-rohingya-
idUSBRE95A04B20130611. 
10  UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (“UNOCHA”), 
HUMANITARIAN BULLETIN: MYANMAR 3, 4 (June 2013), available at http://reliefweb.int/sites/ 
reliefweb.int/files/resources/Myanmar%20Humanitarian%20Bulletin%20June%202013.pdf [hereinafter 
UNOCHA].  The reason that the word “Rohingya” is not used in such documents is that the Rohingya 
have not been allowed to register by government under the term “Rohingya.”  See id.  The UN uses the 
terms “displaced persons” or “Muslim” in such public documents so as to circumvent the Myanmar 
government’s position that there are no Rohingya and so facilitate access to these populations. See 
Interview with U.N. and International Nongovernmental Organization (“INGO”) staff (confidential).  
Some of the Muslims displaced since 2012 identify as Kaman Muslim, which is a Muslim minority from 
Rakhine state that has had better access to Burmese citizenship.  UNOCHA, supra, at 3, 4.  
11  UNOCHA, supra note 10, at 3.  
12  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260 (III) A, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/260(III) (Dec. 9, 1948), available at http://www.oas.org/dil/1948_Convention_on_ 
the_Prevention_and_Punishment_of_the_Crime_of_Genocide.pdf.   
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and instruments of terror and destruction.  The State has adopted policies 
and plans designed to cause harm and destruction to the Rohingya in 
Western Myanmar since the first large scale campaign to illegalize and 
terrorize the Rohingya in February 1978.13  Mass killings in the context of 
Pol Pot’s Cambodia or Rwanda have taken place within short time 
frames.14  However, in the case of the Rohingya in Myanmar, the centrally 
planned large-scale death and destruction of the Rohingya people has been 
achieved over a long-term time frame of several decades. 
During the fifty-year period of military rule, Rohingya areas were 
largely inaccessible to the media and researchers due to the system of 
security grids that contained the Rohingya and restricted outsiders’ access 
to the populations.15  Consequently, the past abuses of the Rohingya have 
been misconstrued as a situation short of intentional destruction of the 
group. 16   There is a growing body of evidence that the Myanmar 
Government at the highest level has subjected the Rohingya to systematic 
abuses and persecution as a matter of state policy.  Much of the 
persecutorial state policies and practices have recently come to light since 
the pogroms aimed at the Rohingya and other non-Rohingya Muslim 
minorities spread across Rakhine State in June and October of 2012.  In 
close collaboration with organized local Rakhine racists, Myanmar state 
security forces have been found to be involved in Rohingya deaths, 
destruction, mass displacement, and forced migration.17   
Analyses of abuses against the Rohingya have largely fallen into two 
broad analytical categories.  The first category views the recent waves of 
                                                      
13  Martin Smith, The Muslim “Rohingya” of Burma (2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
the authors). 
14  Genocide in Rwanda, UNITED HUM. RTS. COUNCIL, http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/ 
genocide/genocide_in_rwanda.htm (last visited May 21, 2014).  On the mass atrocities in Cambodia, see 
Cambodia Profile: A Chronology of Key Events, BBC NEWS ASIA, Sep. 24, 2013, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13006828 
15  Interviews with long-time human rights researchers specializing in Rohingya persecution, in 
London, Kuala Lumpur, and Bangkok (2012-13).  
16  For instance, a legal report by a former Amnesty International researcher on Myanmar does not 
acknowledge an intention to destroy the group, in whole or in part.  See BENJAMIN ZAWACKI, DEFINING 
MYANMAR’S “ROHINGYA PROBLEM” 18 (2013), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/20/3 
zawacki.pdf. 
17  See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ALL YOU CAN DO IS PRAY: CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
AND ETHNIC CLEANSING OF ROHINGYA MUSLIMS IN BURMA’S ARAKAN STATE 53 (Apr. 2013), available 
at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burma0413webwcover_0.pdf; PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS, PATTERNS OF ANTI-MUSLIM VIOLENCE: A CALL FOR ACCOUNTABILITY AND PREVENTION 29 
(Aug. 2013), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burma0413_FullForWeb.pdf.  
For the most recent killing and violence against the Rohingya where the UN has documented the 
collaboration between state security forces and local Rakhine extremists, see Jane Perlez, Rise in Bigotry 
Fuels Massacre Inside Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/03/02/world/asia/rise-in-bigotry-fuels-massacre-inside-myanmar.html?_r=0. 
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violence outside of the historical context as communal violence18 and as 
the dark side of transition,19 largely describing the events as an intolerant 
and spontaneous societal reaction to the Rohingya.20  Such views claim 
that this communal or sectarian violence is a result of the political and 
economic openings that have occurred in Myanmar since 2010, which are 
compounded by government and institutional incompetence and an 
inability to contain violence.21  Far from reflecting the reality on the 
ground, such analysis is a result of political and diplomatic expediency in 
which the economic and political interests of the military/civilian 
government in Myanmar and the economic and geo-political strategic 
interests of foreign governments that benefit from openings in Myanmar 
marry to solidify a discourse of “communal violence.”22  The framing of 
the Rohingya genocide as “communal violence,” in effect, exempts the 
Myanmar State from responsibility and blame for the destruction of the 
Rohingya people.  In contrast, the historical continuity of the abuses and 
strategies used to harm the Rohingya show that the processes are, to a large 
extent, the result of the pre-existing and continuing military and power 
structures, rather than simply the product of recent changes in the formal 
political processes.  These processes and strategies have been facilitated 
and orchestrated by state actors and implemented by a mixture of state and 
non-state actors.  This continuity underlines the intent of state and non-
state actors to bring about the destruction of the Rohingya and thus 
reinforces the argument that the Rohingya are victims of genocide. 
                                                      
18  For an analysis of the problematic term “communal violence,” see Rachel Wagley, In Burma, 
There is No “Communal Violence”, FOREIGN POL’Y J. (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.foreignpolicyjournal. 
com/2013/11/25/in-burma-there-is-no-communal-violence/.  
19  See, e.g., INT’L CRISIS GRP., ASIA REPORT N ° 251, THE DARK SIDE OF TRANSITION: VIOLENCE 
AGAINST MUSLIMS IN MYANMAR (Oct. 1, 2013). 
20  For an analysis of the problematic term “communal violence” see, Wagley, supra note 18.  
21  See, e.g., INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 19.  The International Crisis Group ignores the elephant 
in the room, namely the Myanmar military and its leaders.  As a matter of fact, the Brussels-based 
influential NGO even awarded Myanmar President Thein Sein, formerly fifth-ranking general, its ‘In 
pursuit of Peace’ Award for 2012.   In contrast to the view that the violence in Rakhine State in particular 
and the anti-Muslim violence in Myanmar in general, are primarily ‘communal’ or ‘horizontal’, the May 
19, 2014 news report on the Voice of America Burmese Service confirmed our findings that Myanmar’s 
government and its senior most leaders back and are directly linked to the anti-Muslim religious hatred 
which in turn is used to justify mass violence against Muslim Rohingya.   See Ingyin Myaing and U Sithu 
Aung Myint, Who is behind ‘the defence of Buddhist faith and race’? NEWS, THE VOICE OF AMERICA 
BURMESE PROGRAM (May 19, 2014), http://burmese.voanews.com/content/who-are-backing-up-for-ma-
ba-tha-group-/1917229.html.  For the same link between anti-Rohingya racist attacks and popular hatred 
towards Rohingya (and Myanmar’s other Muslims) see Malik, Kenan, Op-Ed: Myanmar’s Buddhist 
Bigots, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/20/opinion/malik-myanmars-
buddhist-bigots.html.  
22  See Glenn Kessler, How Much Has the United States Been ‘Standing Up Against’ Atrocities in 
Burma?, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/ 
2013/12/31/how-much-has-the-united-states-been-standing-up-against-atrocities-in-burma/. 
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The second analysis views the State and security forces as central 
actors in the recent violence, actively participating in violence and abuses 
against the Rohingya, standing by while the violence and abuses against 
the Rohingya took place in full purview of state actors,23 and/or facilitating 
processes of impunity for the perpetrators of violence and abuses against 
the Rohingya.24  Such analysis—most significantly the in-depth Human 
Rights Watch’s report of 2013—has placed the abuses within the 
frameworks of crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. 25  Crimes 
against humanity are defined as eleven acts committed “as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, 
with knowledge of the attack.”26  Crimes against humanity frameworks are 
complimentary to readings of genocide, but do not go so far as to include 
aspects of intent to destroy a given people, either in part or in whole.27  
While we do not dispute that the abuses against the Rohingya can be read 
and analyzed as crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing,28 this article 
goes a step further to argue that the abuses against the Rohingya, in both 
the contemporary and historical contexts, constitute an intention to destroy 
the Rohingya as an ethno-religious group and thus constitute genocide.  
The authors’ analysis connects the dots that relate to intent to destroy, not 
simply documenting this thirty-five year process of destruction, but also 
shedding light on the ways in which the military-controlled state in 
Myanmar operates.   
                                                      
23  See, e.g., THE EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST, BURNING HOMES, SINKING LIVES: A SITUATION REPORT 
ON THE VIOLENCE AGAINST ROHINGYA IN MYANMAR AND THEIR REFOULEMENT FROM BANGLADESH 
(June 2012); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE GOVERNMENT COULD HAVE STOPPED THIS: SECTARIAN 
VIOLENCE AND THE ENSUING ABUSES IN BURMA’S ARAKAN STATE (Aug. 2013), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burma0812webwcover_0.pdf. 
24  See Agence France-Presse, Myanmar Accused of Ethnic Cleansing by Human Rights Watch Dog, 
THE RAW STORY, Apr. 22, 2013, http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/04/22/myanmar-accused-of-ethnic-
cleansing-by-human-rights-watchdog/. 
25  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 17.  
26  Rome Statute of International Criminal Court art. 7, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf. 
27  Id. at art. 6-7. 
28  Ethnic-cleansing is not formally defined as an international crime, but means “rendering an area 
ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area,” 
thus the emphasis is on removal rather than destruction of a group.  ZAWACKI, supra note 16, at 22 
(citing Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serb. and Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶ 190 (Feb. 26, 2007)).  Moves toward 
the homogeneity of Buddhist Rakhine areas in Rakhine State are well documented.  See, e.g., HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, BURMA: NEW VIOLENCE IN ARAKAN STATE, SATELLITE IMAGERY SHOWS WIDE-SPREAD 
DESTRUCTION OF ROHINGYA HOMES, PROPERTY (2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/news/ 
2012/10/26/burma-new-violence-arakan-state.  This article argues that systematic abuses against the 
Rohingya have aimed not only to remove the Rohingya from land in Rakhine State, but also to destroy 
the Rohingya as a group.  Id.  
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Part II provides the historical context within which the genocide 
takes place.  First, the authors establish the Rohingyas’ long history in 
Rakhine State to provide the setting against which the authors later 
describe the erasure of the Rohingyas’ history and identity as part of a 
State process.  Second, the authors examine how anti-Rohingya racism has 
been deliberately encoded in the law and policy framework that relates to 
stateless Rohingya in Myanmar.    
Part III lays out the mechanisms of the slow-burning genocide.  The 
first of these mechanisms described in Section A, namely violence, forced 
migration, and illegalization, tracks three of the acts of genocide laid out in 
the 1948 Genocide Convention:  a) killing, b) causing serious bodily and 
mental harm, and c) deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.  The second 
mechanism of marriage and birth restrictions, described in Section B, 
tracks a fourth act of genocide, d) imposing measures intended to prevent 
births within the group.  Section C discusses the third mechanism, whereby 
deliberate destruction of the social foundations of the Rohingya as an 
ethno-religious group inflicts by a different means the fourth act of 
genocide, creating conditions of life calculated to bring about the group’s 
physical destruction.  The last mechanisms, discussed in Section D, 
demonstrates the state’s intent to destroy the Rohingya through the erasure 
of their legal and ethnic identity.  
In Part IV, we discuss the implications of genocide by placing the 
term genocide and how it relates to the Rohingya in Myanmar in a 
domestic and international political context, considering what role legal 
pragmatism and diplomatic expediency relating to international strategic 
interests play in the international acceptance of the concept of genocide in 
Myanmar.  Finally, in Part V, the authors conclude by arguing that the rise 
in violence and discrimination against the Rohingya in Rakhine State is a 
continuation of the military structures and policies—as opposed to an 
inevitable, if unfortunate, part of Myanmar’s much-lauded transition to 
democracy—that have been implemented with the purpose of destroying 
the Rohingya as a people.  What Burma’s Muslim Rohingya have 
experienced since the first State-organized ‘immigration’ campaign in 
February of 1978 falls within the acts spelled out in the Genocide 
Convention. While this research draws on the growing body of 
documentary evidence relating to abuses against the Rohingya, the authors 
also draw on their first-hand research conducted over three years working 
with and interviewing the Rohingyas in Rangoon as well as Rohingya 
refugees and established members of the Rohingya diaspora in countries 
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including Bangladesh, Malaysia, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and continental Europe.  
II.  HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE ROHINGYA GENOCIDE 
In Myanmar, the popularly held belief is that Rakhine State has been 
home to an indigenous and largely stable population of Rakhine Buddhists 
who have been under threat demographically and economically in recent 
years from immigrant Bengalis, a racial term imposed on the Rohingya.29  
In fact, Rakhine State history is one of social, economic, and demographic 
interdependence with Bengal, with influences from elsewhere in India, 
Persia, and the Arabic world.30  Section A challenges the popularly held 
notions of Rakhine history and establishes the long and rich history of the 
Rohingya in Rakhine State.  Section B describes how anti-Rohingya 
racism was encoded in law, beginning in 1962.  This history provides the 
background for the act of genocide described in Part III.  
 
A. The Rohingya Had an Established and Recognized Ethnic Identity 
and Presence in Rakhine State Prior to the Beginning of Military 
Rule in Burma in 1962 
 
Rakhine is the ancestral home of the Rohingya.31  Ultra-nationalist 
Rakhine Buddhists vehemently reject this view, framing the Rohingyas as 
illegal immigrants who migrated from East Bengal during the British rule 
of Burma and/or after Burma and Pakistan’s independence in 1948 and 
1947, respectively. 32  Official Myanmar state histories and law support this 
view, which claim there are no Rohingya in the history of Myanmar,33 and 
exclude the Rohingya from the list of 135 state-recognized ethnic groups 
of Myanmar that is enshrined in the citizenship law and the constitution.34  
                                                      
29  This view was initially generated by the State in Burma under the Burma Socialist Programme 
Party Government of ex-General Ne Win in the late 1970’s.  It has since has become part of the popular 
discourse, so much so that even a BBC Burmese editor found it unnecessary to problematize it in a half-
hour discussion on BBC Radio Four, the British equivalent of the US National Public Radio.  See Beyond 
Belief: Violence and Buddhism, BBC RADIO FOUR, Aug 19, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
programmes/b038c0f6.  
30  For a full account, see MOSHE YEGAR, THE MUSLIMS OF BURMA: A STUDY OF A MINORITY 
GROUP (1972). 
31   Id. at 25 (citing Ba Tha, Rowengyees in Arakan, VII GUARDIAN MONTHLY 33-36 (1960)). 
32  AYE CHAN & U SHW ZAN, INFLUX VIRUS – THE ILLEGAL MUSLIMS IN ARAKAN (2005). 
33  Interview with the Commander of Western Command, Rakhine State, THE MYANMAR HERALD, 
(May 16, 2014) (Burmese language).  
34  The list of 135 “national races” was published in LT-COL HLA MIN, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, 
UNION OF MYAN., POLITICAL SITUATION OF MYANMAR AND ITS ROLE IN THE REGION, 95-99 (2001). 
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According to the Rakhine nationalist narratives, the term Rohingya was 
created in the 1950s to promote the political demands of the Bengalis in 
Myanmar.35 
In fact, there are clear references to the Rohingya, whose faith was 
identified as Islam, residing in Rakhine State before independence and 
even before the colonial period.  In 1799, before the British colonization of 
Burma, Francis Buchanan, in his study of languages,  recorded three 
dialects derived from India:  “The first is that spoken by the 
Mohammedans, who have long settled in Arakan, and who call themselves 
Rooinga, or natives of Arakan.”36  Additionally, the Paton report of 1826, 
written when the British moved into Rakhine State, estimated that sixty 
percent of the population was “Mugh,” or Rakhine, and thirty percent was 
“Mussalman,” or Muslim.37  (Muslims of Arakan or Rakhine State and 
Rohingya in this context, as in later contexts, are overlapping categories).  
Muslims of Rakhine State (or Rakhine Muslims), with the fluidity typical 
of ethnic and religious identity formation,38 have identified as Rohingya to 
some degree for centuries.39  The Rohingya ethnic identity has become 
                                                      
35  See, e.g., Daw Saw Khin Tint, President of Rakhine Women’s Association, Speech (Dec. 22, 
2012) (transcript on file with the authors) (“A Muslim called Abdu Gava used a brand new term 
‘Rohingya’ in 1951 and created a brand new nationality ‘Rohingya’ in Arakan.  So called Rohingya who 
had been created thus have presented to the world saying ‘We Rohingyas, have lived in Arakan for about 
1000 years – prior to these present Arakanese people. So Arakan is our land. Arakanese are our 
nationality.’”).  
36  Francis Buchanan, A Comparative Vocabulary of Some of the Languages Spoken In the Burma 
Empire, 5 ASIATIC RES. 219 (1799), reprinted in 1 SCH. ORIENTAL AFR. STUD. BULL. BURMA RES. 40, 55 
(2003). See also HENRY GLASSFORD BELL, AN ACCOUNT OF THE BURMAN EMPIRE COMPILED FROM THE 
WORKS OF COLONEL SYMES, MAJOR CANNING, CAPTAIN COX, DR. LEYDEN, DR. BUCHANAN, ETC. 66 
(1852) (“[T]he Mohommedans who have been long settled in the country, call themselves Rooinga, or 
natives of Arracan.”). 
37  CHARLES PATON, A SHORT REPORT ON ARAKAN 36 (Apr. 26, 1826).  Paton was the first British 
colonial administrator with the rank of sub-Commissioner of Arakan.  His report which included 
demographic data, customs, military affairs, etc. seems to have eventually reached the British Prime 
Minister’s office at 10 Downing Street, London in June 1826.   (Photostats copy on file with the authors). 
It should be noted that Rakhine State at this time was largely depopulated, since many local 
populations—both Buddhist and Muslim—had fled to the Chittagong region during the period of brutal 
colonial Burmese rule in Rakhine State. Many of those who had fled returned soon after the British took 
control of Rakhine State. The figures relate to “Arracan and its dependencies Ramree, Cheduba and 
Sandaway.” The report uses the term “Mugh” and “Mussalman” to refer to the Rakhine Buddhist 
populations and the Rakhine Muslim populations respectively.  These terms were later contested by local 
populations and are today considered derogatory in Myanmar.  See Interview with A.F.K. Jilani, 
Rohingya Scholar, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (May 2013); Interview with Abdul Hamid Bin Musa Ali, 
President, Rohingya Society in Malaysia, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (Dec. 2012).  
38  On the fluidity of ethnic identity see the pioneering work of Edmund Leach.  See EDMUND 
LEACH, POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF HIGHLAND BURMA: A STUDY OF KACHIN SOCIAL STRUCTURE (1954). 
See also F. K. LEHMAN, THE STRUCTURE OF CHIN SOCIETY: A TRIBAL PEOPLE OF BURMA ADAPTED TO A 
NON-WESTERN CIVILIZATION (1963); JAMES C. SCOTT, THE ART OF NOT BEING GOVERNED: AN 
ANARCHIST HISTORY OF UPLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA (2009). 
39  See Buchanan, supra note 36; BELL, supra note 36, at 66.  
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more salient in post-independence Myanmar, where national belonging and 
minority representation has been defined primarily through race and 
ethnicity.40 
The Rakhine region of western Burma borders the sub-continent of 
India, notably East Bengal (later East Pakistan after the partition of India in 
1947 and, since 1971, the independent nation-state of Bangladesh), and is 
divided from the rest of Myanmar by high mountains known as the Yoma 
or Arakan Range.41  The Rakhine region has a long coastal stretch along 
the Bay of Bengal, which merges into the Indian Ocean.42  Because of this 
geography, the region as a whole has a unique history vis-à-vis the 
landlocked central political systems of ancient Burmese Buddhists, and has 
a history of interdependence with Bengal, which was a natural source of 
cultural, economic, and labor exchange.43  Thus, to claim that Rakhine was 
only home only to Buddhist populations in centuries past is ahistorical.  
Today’s Rohingya draw their ancestral and cultural roots and 
heritage from the multi-ethnic Muslim people who populated this coastal 
state.  During the centuries prior to British colonial rule in the Arakan 
region in the 1820s, Arakan’s administrative and political borders 
fluctuated based on the throne’s waxing and waning ability to control 
subject populations and un-demarcated territories.44  The Arakan coastal 
region was populated by a thriving multi-ethnic and multi-faith people, 
both transitory commercial communities and more permanent residents—
including Armenians, Portuguese, Dutch, Persians, Arabs, as well as 
populations who are known in today’s Myanmar as Chin.45  In those days, 
not only were the territorial boundaries fluid, but so too were ethnic 
identity formations.46  Ethnicity in this part of the old Arakan was not a 
                                                      
40  Interview with Rohingya activist (name withheld), in Yangon (June 2013) (Burma). 
41  M. ISMAEL KHIN MAUNG, THE POPULATION OF BURMA: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 1973 CENSUS 3 
(1986) (including a map of Burma and adjacent countries). 
42  Id.  
43  Pamela Gutman, Between India and Southeast Asia-Arakan, Burmas Forgotten Kingdom, 
ARAKAN KOTAWCHAY (Dec. 28, 2008), http://arakankotawchay.blogspot.com/2011/06/between-india-
and-southeast-asia-arakan.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2014). 
44  VICTOR B. LIEBERMAN, STRANGE PARALLELS: SOUTHEAST ASIA IN GLOBAL CONTEXT, C. 800-
1830 (2003). 
45  Aung Aung Hlaing, The Coexistence of Orthogenetic and Heterogenetic City Cultures at 
Ancient Mrauk-U, 2 SCHOLAR RES. DEV. J. 119 (2011).  See also, Abu Anin, Towards Understanding 
Arakan History (Part I): A Study on the Issue of Ethnicity in Arakan, Myanmar, MERHROM Ch. 1 (Mar. 
4, 2009), https://merhrom.wordpress.com/2009/03/04/towards-understanding-arakan-history-part-i/ (last 
visited May 20, 2014).  
46  Michael Charney, Crisis and Reformation in a Maritime Kingdom of Southeast Asia: Forces of 
Instability and Political Disintegration in Western Burma (Arakan) 1603-1701, 41(2) J. ECON. SOC. HIST. 
ORIENT 185 (1998).   
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settled subject.47  Thus, the Muslims of Rakhine region over the centuries 
have had many terms by which to identify themselves, including the terms 
Rakhine Muslim, Arakan Muslim, and Rohingya, the last of which has 
become more prominent in recent times.48 
As the dominant majority group in Arakan, the Rakhine Buddhists49 
today have largely defined their own ethnic identity and those they 
consider outsiders or others as something set in stone, claiming that the 
Rakhine region is only for Rakhine Buddhists.50  Strongly dismissing the 
borderland people of Rohingya as alien invaders on the purely Buddhist 
Rakhine soil, Mr. Aye Maung, the influential Rakhine Member of the 
Parliament and Chairman of the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party 
(RNDP), spelled out his party’s vision of the Rakhine state thus: “We need 
to rebuild the Rakhine State only for the Rakhine who alone are the 
indigenous on the soil.”51  Thus, they overlook the long history of the 
Rohingya in the Rakhine region and claim that Rohingya is a recently 
invented ethnicity because the term was not included in British surveys 
during the colonial era.52  According to our in-depth interviews with 
Rohingya refugees, émigrés, and residents inside and outside Burma, those 
from whom the Rohingya are descended were included in multiple other 
categories.  In fact, many Rakhine Buddhists also lived between East 
Bengal and Rakhine State themselves,53 and many of their descendants live 
in modern day Bangladesh with full Bangladeshi citizenship rights,54 
demonstrating that the populations in this region straddled the modern 
borders.   
                                                      
47  See, e.g., F. K. Lehman, Ethnic Categories in Burma and the Theory of Social Systems, in 
SOUTHEAST ASIAN TRIBES, MINORITIES, AND NATIONS 105-07, 111-11 (Peter Kunstadter ed., 1967); 
LEACH, supra note 38. 
48 Habib Sadiqui, Muslim Identity and Demography in Arakan: Part 3. The Muslim Factor in 
Arakan, HABIB SADIQUI (Oct. 9, 2011), http://drhabibsiddiqui.blogspot.com/2011/10/muslim-factor-in-
arakan-burma.html (last visited 10 Jan. 2014). 
49  The term Rakhine today has largely come to mean Buddhist with ancestral roots in Rakhine or 
Arakan. In the past, it may have had a broader meaning used for the general populations of the Rakhine 
region.  See Charney, supra note 8. 
50  See Interview with Dr. Aye Maung, RNDP Chair and MP, 3 Venue News (June 14, 2012) (on 
file with the authors). 
51  Id.  
52  KEI NEMOTO, THE ROHINGYA ISSUE: A THORNY ISSUE BETWEEN BURMA (MYANMAR) AND 
BANGLEDESH, particularly pp.7-12, available at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/Kei_Nemoto-
Rohingya.pdf.  
53 Abid Bahar, Burmese Invasion of Arakan and the Rise of Non-Bengali Settlements in 
Bangladesh, BURMA TIMES, Jan. 31, 2013, http://burmatimes.net/burmese-invasion-of-arakan-and-the-
rise-of-non-bengali-settlements-in-bangladesh/.  See also various Burmese language works by Burma’s 
preeminent historian, the late Professor Than Tun from Mandalay University. 
54  Interviews with Rohingyas who have lived in Bangladesh before emigrating on to third 
countries on Bangladeshi passports, in London and Kuala Lumpur (2012). 
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Migrations from Bengal into Rakhine before the inception of border 
control are used to claim that the Rohingya are Bengalis who arrived in the 
British era55 and should be expelled from Burma.56  In 1824, the Rakhine 
region changed hands when the British crushed the Burmese troops over a 
territorial dispute near Rakhine and annexed the two coastal regions of pre-
colonial Burma, namely Rakhine and Tenessarim, as a province of British 
India.57  The wet-rice agricultural economy in British colonial Rakhine 
boomed as the direct result of the British efforts to realize the commercial 
potential of the fertile Rakhine land and extremely favorable monsoon 
rainfall.58  Rakhine in turn became an economic magnet attracting waves of 
migrant and seasonal workers from all directions, including Burmese and 
Mon farmers and laborers, both migratory and seasonal, from other parts of 
feudal Burma, including Rangoon59 and upper Burma, as well as from 
neighboring India.60  
Rohingya is not simply a self-referential group identity, but an 
official group and ethnic identity recognized by the post-independence 
state.  In the early years of Myanmar’s independence, the Rohingya were 
recognized as a legitimate ethnic group that deserved a homeland in 
Burma.61  In 1954, Prime Minister U Nu highlighted the Rohingya Muslim 
political loyalty to the predominantly Buddhist country in his radio address 
to the nation.62  This speech is significant in its use of the term Rohingya, a 
term that the State today refuses to use,63 and also in highlighting the role 
of the Rohingya in the newly independent nation.  Following Burma’s 
independence, under the premiership of U Nu, a special administrative 
                                                      
55  Inkey, supra note 3. 
56  Francis Khoo Thwe, Buddhist Monks Back President Thein Sein’s Move to Expel Rohingyas, 
ASIANEWS.IT, Sept. 4, 2012, http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Buddhist-monks-back-President-Thein-
Sein%E2%80%99s-move-to-expel-Rohingyas-25723.html. 
57 ANGLO-BURMESE WARS, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, http://global.britannica.com/ 
EBchecked/topic/24993/Anglo-Burmese-Wars (last visited Jan. 10, 2014). 
58  JOHN CHRISTIAN, MODERN BURMA: A SURVEY OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Ch. 
VII (1942). 
59  Rangoon, the old capital of Burma, with its thriving commercial class, was sixty percent Indian 
throughout the British colonial rule.  The Burmese nationalists did not consider Rangoon the Burmese 
center.  See AUNG GYI, I AM AN UPPER BURMA MAN AND OTHER ESSAYS (Yangon, Myanmar, 2012).  
This volume is a collection of Burmese language biographical essays written by a well-known nationalist 
leader the late ex-Brigadier Aung Gyi.   
60  J. RUSSELL ANDRUS, BURMESE ECONOMIC LIFE 14-16 (1947). 
61  Transcript of Speech by Deputy Commander-in-Chief Brigadier General Aung Gyi, MYANMAR 
AHLIN NEWSPAPER, July 8, 1961, at 5-6.  
62  Prime Minister U Nu, Lessons from the Religious Conflict for the State in Myanmar (radio 
address to the nation) (Sept. 25, 1954) (transcript on file with the authors).  
63  During the question and answer following his speech at the Chatham House, London, the 
Myanmar President officially denied the existence of not just the Rohingya as a group, but as a term.  See 
Inkey, supra note 3.  In his own words: “We don’t have the term ‘Rohingya.’”  Id.   
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zone called May Yu was established in the 1950s, incorporating a large part 
of what is now North Rakhine State (Buthidaung, Maungdaw, and parts of 
Rathedaung) in which the majority of the inhabitants were Rohingya.64  
The creation of this district, administered separately from the rest of 
Rakhine State by the central state, is significant recognition of both the 
identity and rights of the Rohingya in independent Burma.  Among the 
stated objectives of the May Yu administrative region was to “strive for 
peace with Pakistan,” which at that time incorporated today’s Bangladesh, 
by establishing an official homeland for the Muslims of the northern areas 
of Rakhine State and recognizing that the Rohingya were part of a 
population that straddled both sides of the Myanmar-East Pakistan 
border.65  
Brigadier Aung Gyi, one of the senior deputies of General Ne Win, 
was emphatic about the indigenous nature of the Rohingya people when he 
officially explained the nature of borderlands people in 1961:  
 
On the west, May Yu district borders with Pakistan.  As is the 
case with all borderlands communities, there are Muslims on 
both sides of the borders.  Those who are on Pakistan’s side 
are known as Pakistani while the Muslims on our Burmese side 
of the borders are referred to as ‘Rohingya.’  Here I must stress 
that this is not a case where one single race splits itself into 
two communities in two different neighbouring countries.  If 
you look at the Sino-Burmese border region, you will see this 
kind of phenomenon, namely ‘adjacent people’.  To give you a 
concrete example, take Lisu of Kachin state, or La-wa (or Wa) 
and E-kaw of the same Kachin State by the Chinese 
borderlands.  They all straddle on both sides of the borders.  
Likewise, the Shan can be found on the Chinese side as well as 
in Thailand – and they are known as ‘Tai’ or ‘Dai’ over there... 
They speak similar language and they have a common 
religion.66  
                                                      
64  Myanmar’s official encyclopedia (in the Burmese language) published by the Government 
Printing House in 1964, during the early years of General Ne Win’s Revolutionary Council, described the 
populations in these townships as seventy-five percent Rohingya—it is notable that the term Rohingya 
was used, not Bengali—while the rest was made up of other ethnic groups including the Chin, Myii, 
Kaman, Rakhine, and so on. THE UNION OF BURMA, MYANMAR ENCYCLOPEDIA 90 (1964).  The Western 
Command regional commander, not provincial civil administration made up of Rakhine locals, was 
directly in charge of May Yu District Affairs.   
65  Transcript of Speech by Deputy Commander-in-Chief Brigadier General Aung Gyi, supra note 
61, at 5-6. 
66  Id. 
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As Brigadier Aung Gyi correctly stressed, in all post-colonial nation-states, 
ethno-linguistic communities straddle the borders of newly independent 
nations.67  
The process of erasing the Rohingyas’ identity and rights as well as 
physically destroying them began in the first decades of military rule under 
General Ne Win and continues to the present day.  Part B discusses the 
history of the Rohingya’s legal standing as an ethnic group during the 
period of military rule until today.  The broader history vis-à-vis the state 
during this period is defined as part of the genocidal processes in 
Section III.  
 
B. Anti-Rohingya Racism Becomes Encoded in Law and Policy in Post-
1962 Independent Myanmar via the Citizenship Law 
This section describes Myanmar’s post-colonial nation-building 
project and the wider national milieu within which anti-Rohingya racism 
was encoded in law and policy during the General Ne Win era, beginning 
in 1962.  Anti-Rohingya and anti-Muslim policy advisers and intellectuals 
from nationalist Rakhine groups successfully sought to eliminate the 
Rohingya from the demographic map of citizenship through the 1982 
Citizenship Act.  Such racism continues to maintain and propagate the law 
and policy framework that relates directly to the destruction of the 
Rohingya.68  
Following the declaration of independence in 1948, Myanmar was 
left with the daunting task of building a nation-state from the remnants of a 
post-conflict (World War II) territory that had never existed as a politically 
cohesive, centrally administered, multi-ethnic unit with a settled national 
identity.  The British had administered the combined territories of upper 
and lower Burma as “Burma Proper” and the country’s various 
borderlands, “Frontier Areas,” from separate administrative homes in 
Calcutta and London, respectively.69  The place-making and claim-staking 
processes that ensued as part of this nation-building process cemented a 
rigid framework for understanding Myanmar’s considerable ethnic 
diversity.   
One of the key issues in establishing the foundations of belonging 
and citizenship of the new Myanmar was how to deal with the considerable 
                                                      
67  Id. 
68  An Historian looks at Rohingya: An interview with Dr Aye Kyaw, THE IRRAWADDY, (Oct. 7, 
2009), http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=16946&page=1. 
69  MAUNG MAUNG, BURMA IN THE FAMILY OF NATIONS 69-70 (1957).  
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migration from colonial South Asia to colonial Burma during the British 
period, a significant proportion of which occurred between 1824 and 1935 
in light of growing anti-Indian racism. 70   Following the economic 
depression of the 1930s and the oppressive measures taken against local 
Burmese71 uprisings in Burma by the British and their largely Indian 
security forces and administration, resentment against the British and 
Indians was at a high in the new Myanmar state.72   Further, under Britain’s 
colonial rule (1824-1948), the Burmese experienced colonial economic 
exploitation as two-layered:  the British occupied the top of the colonial 
hierarchy, socially, economically, and politically; the Indians (and to a 
lesser extent Chinese) dominated the middle layer; and finally the 
Burmese, especially tradition-bound Buddhists, were at the bottom. 73  
Anti-foreign, most specifically anti-Indian and anti-Chinese, racism 
developed as a historical and societal reaction to this sordid state of 
Burmese affairs.74   
Against this backdrop, the idea of belonging based on affiliation to 
the national races gained traction over notions that favored residence or 
birth within the territory.  General Ne Win harnessed these racialized and 
anti-colonialist notions to solidify his power structures,75  and were set in 
stone in the Citizenship Act that was drafted in 1982.  As then military 
dictator, Ne Win noted in a speech regarding the drafting process of this 
law: 
 
We, the natives or Burmese nationals, were unable to shape 
our own destiny.  We were subjected to the manipulations of 
others from 1824 to 4 January 1948.  Let us now look back at 
the conditions that prevailed at the time we regained 
                                                      
70  NEMOTO, supra note 52. 
71  Burmese in this context is used to denote the local populations of Burma irrespective of 
ethnicity. 
72  RIOT INQUIRY COMMITTEE, INTERIM REPORT OF THE RIOT INQUIRY COMMITTEE (Rangoon 
1939). 
73  For one of the best studies on the subject of colonial policy and practice, see JOHN S. 
FURNIVALL, COLONIAL POLICY AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF BURMA AND THE 
NETHERLANDS INDIA (1948). 
74  For thorough Burmese and English language analyses on the roots of popular Burmese racism, 
see Thein Pe Myint, The Battle Between the Indians and the Bama/Burmese, in COMMUNISM AND WE 
THE BURMESE 158-180 (Thein Pe Myint ed., 3d ed. 1967).  This Burmese language essay was first 
published as a newspaper article in 1935, five years after the first large-scale race riot between the 
Indians and the Burmese during the colonial era.  For an English language inquiry exploring the history 
and causes of popular Burmese resentment and racism, see RIOT INQUIRY COMMITTEE, supra note 72.  
75  Ne Win, Translation of the Speech by General Ne Win, THE WORKING PEOPLE’S DAILY, (Oct. 9, 
1982) (translating General Ne Win, President, Address at President’s House (Oct. 8, 1982)), 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/162589794/Ne-Win-s-Speech-1982-Citizenship-Law. 
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independence on 4 January 1948.  We then find that the 
people in our country comprised of true nationals, guests, 
issues from unions between nationals and guests or mixed 
bloods, and issues from unions between guests and 
guests . . . . This became a problem after independence. The 
problem was how to clarify the position of guests and mixed 
bloods. When the problem was tackled, two laws emerged 
[the Union Citizenship Act of 1948 and Union Citizenship 
Election Acts of 1948].76    
 
It is clear from this statement that the Citizen Act of 1982 was founded 
primarily on the popular notion of indigenous races (or Taiyintha in 
Burmese, meaning original children of the soil) in order to harness anti-
colonial sentiment in post-independence Myanmar.  
The law draws on a list of 135 ethnic groups, which excludes some 
minority groups such as the Rohingya.77  Members of the 135 ethnic 
groups are automatically eligible for full citizenship in Myanmar. 78  
Individuals who are not members of these groups must acquire nationality 
through different application procedures, which have excessively high 
criteria, and are largely insurmountable for the Rohingya.79  These acquired 
nationalities, most relevantly naturalized citizen, come with a different set 
of rights, and it can take two generations for naturalized citizenship to be 
translated into full citizenship.80 
Using the language of national security, Chairman Ne Win made 
clear in 1982 that tayoke (Chinese) and kalars (the local racist term for 
dark-skinned people of Indian origin or Muslims) cannot be entrusted with 
any important positions in Myanmar's officialdom, including the 
bureaucracy and armed forces.81  As Ne Win unequivocally put it, all 
guests and mixed bloods were in Myanmar due to the legacy of British 
colonial rule.82  According to the 1982 Citizenship Act and this speech, 
                                                      
76  Id.  For an analysis that traces the institutionalization anti-foreign racism by the military leaders 
see Maung Zarni, Military Roots of Racism in Myanmar, ASIA TIMES, Sep. 13, 2013, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/SEA-01-030913.html.  
77  Burma Citizenship Law (Pyithu Hluttaw Law), Oct. 15, 1982, No. 4 (Myan.) [hereinafter 1982 
Citizenship Act], available at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/Citizenship%20Law.htm. 
78  Id.  
79  Chris Lewa, North Arakan: An Open Prison for the Rohingya in Burma, 32 FORCED MIGRATION 
REV. 11 (2009). 
80  For the three categories of citizenship—full citizenship, associate citizenship and naturalized 
citizenship, see 1982 Citizenship Act, supra note 77. 
81  Ne Win, supra note 75.  
82  Id.  
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those who came after the first Anglo-Burmese war of 1824 were not 
granted citizenship rights or state protections, even if they had settled in 
the country for over a century.83  Permanent residency was more cause for 
suspicion than grounds for receiving full-citizenship, according to Ne 
Win’s speech:  
 
[T]heir penchant for making money by all means and knowing 
this, how could we trust them in our organizations that decide 
the destiny of our country? . . . We will therefore not give them 
full citizenship and full rights.  Nevertheless, we will extend 
them rights to a certain extent.  We will give them the right to 
earn according to their work and live a decent life.  No more.84   
 
This quotation illustrates the racist basis for the Citizenship Act. 
Racism was widespread and colonially rooted, especially toward the 
dark-skinned, hard-working races who, according to stereo-types of the 
time manned the British colonial administration, possessed entrepreneurial 
skills, sided with the British colonizers, married local Buddhist women, 
and procreated impure bloods. 85   Military leaders and their civilian 
technocratic advisers, who were no less racist, combined Myanmar’s 
historically-rooted popular racism and the State’s official racist policies 
and practices in mutually beneficial arrangements.  Popular racism and the 
state’s racially grounded policies and law became mutually reinforcing.  
The Rohingya, as the largest Muslim minority in Myanmar and with 
linguistic and cultural affiliations with populations in Chittagong in 
Bangladesh,86 became the primary victims of this law despite the fact that 
many of them had resided in Myanmar for centuries with roots going back 
to the pre-colonial era.  
                                                      
83  Id.  
84  Id.  
85 RIOT INQUIRY COMMITTEE, supra note 72.  As the aforementioned report made it clear, one of 
the oldest sources of very strong anti-Muslim resentment amongst the majority local Buddhist 
populations is Islam’s insistence on the conversion of non-Muslims, both men and women, before a 
marriage with all the spousal rights and protections could be accepted.  Both the Burmese lay public and 
the culturally influential Buddhist Order over the past 100 years have generally, if not always actively, 
opposed Burmese Buddhists, especially women, marrying Muslim men complying with Islam’s demand 
for conversion upon marriage.  Military leaders and their civilian technocratic advisers, who were no less 
racist, married Myanmar’s historically rooted popular racism and the State’s official racist policies and 
practices in mutually beneficial arrangements. 
86  Noteworthy is the fact that the linguistic affinity between Burma’s Rohingya and the 
Bengladeshi in Chittagong region of Bangladesh does not extend beyond Chittagong.  Chittagong itself 
was formerly an integral part of the old Arakan Kingdom, which the Burmese eventually annexed in 
1785.  Interview with a Rohingya businessman originally from Maung Daw, a Rohingya enclave, in 
Kuala Lumpur (Dec. 23, 2013) (Malaysia).  
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The passage of the 1982 Citizenship Act was the culmination of 
state-sponsored acts that had already assaulted the Rohingya’s citizenship 
rights.  Upon independence from Britain and before the enactment of this 
Citizenship Law, the Rohingya enjoyed full citizenship.  Prior to the first 
decades of independence, many Rohingya were entitled to automatic 
citizenship, 87  though they were not required to be documented.88   A 
Rohingya was entitled to citizenship if he or she had one grandparent 
considered a member of a national race of Burma or if two grandparents 
had made Burma their permanent home.89  Many Rohingya were also 
issued National Registration Cards (“NRCs”), one of the clearest 
indications of their entitlement to be citizens, and their former status as 
Myanmar citizens.90  Additionally, the Rohingya were not yet specifically 
excluded from the “indigenous races of Burma,”91 which were defined 
loosely as “the Arakanese, Burmese, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah, Mon, or 
Shan race and such racial groups as has settled in any of the territories 
included within the Union as their permanent home from a period anterior 
to 1823 A.D.”92  These races, which were not defined further, did not 
expressly include or exclude the Rohingya, as they could have been 
considered “Arakanese” Muslim or another “such racial group.”93   
After the military came to power in 1962, a variety of vigorous 
nationalist measures were adopted, leading to several major exoduses of 
people of Indian and Chinese ancestries. 94   For instance, the radical 
nationalization measures instituted in 1964 95  pauperized hundreds of 
                                                      
87  The Union Citizenship Act, 1948 art. 3(1), 4(2) (Myan.). 
88  The Residents of Burma Registration Act, 1949, (on file with authors) which required residents 
to register was not implemented until after 1958.  See Interview with A.F.K. Jilani, supra note 37.  In fact, 
the National Registration Cards issued by the government to all citizens including the Rohingya did not 
mention either race or religion of the holder.  Id.    
89  The Union Citizenship Act, 1948 (Myan.); The Union Citizenship Regulations, 1949 (Myan.). 
90  Residents of Burma Registration Rules, 1951 art. 33, 34 (unofficial translation), 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs12/Residents_of_Burma_Registration_Rules-1951.pdf.  
91  The Union Citizenship Act, 1948 art. 3(1) (Myan.).  
92  Id.  
93  Id.  
94   For an overview of the migration of the people of Indian origin, see Myanmar, MINISTRY OF 
OVERSEAS INDIAN AFFAIRS, REPUBLIC OF INDIA 2-3, available at http://moia.gov.in/pdf/Myanmar.pdf.  
On the subject of Chinese migration to and from Burma, see Overseas Chinese in Myanmar, 
CHINATOWNOLOGY, http://www.chinatownology.com/overseas_chinese_burma.html (last visited May 24, 
2014).  
95  For a brief discussion of the impact on the country’s Indo-Burmese and Indian population of 
General Ne Win’s racially motivated economic nationalization, see Thin Thin Aung & Soe Myint, India-
Burma Relations, in CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRATIZATION IN BURMA  87 (2001), available at 
http://www.idea.int/asia_pacific/burma/upload/chap4.pdf. 
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thousands of Burmese of Indian ancestry and Indians, triggering a wave of 
Indian out-migration.96   
The move toward denying the Rohingya their rights as citizens of 
Burma began at the onset of military rule.  The first large-scale operation 
in 1978 sought to separate nationals from non-nationals and formally 
severed the Rohingya from their citizenship rights.97  In the run-up to 
Operation Nagamin in 1978, many of the Rohingya had their NRCs taken 
from them by state actors and the documents were never replaced.98  The 
operation descended into large-scale violence and around 200,000 
Rohingya fled to Bangladesh.99  However, a bilateral agreement between 
Bangladesh and Burma forced the Burmese government to accept the 
repatriation of the Rohingya.100  
The 1982 Citizenship Act was promulgated in response to both the 
Rohingya repatriations101 and the failure of diplomatic efforts with the 
Islamic countries.102  Only then were the eight broad national races broken 
down into 135 ethnic groups that excluded the Rohingya and other smaller 
minority groups in Myanmar.103  The omission of the Rohingya during the 
process of drafting this law was spelled out by Dr. Aye Kyaw,104  a 
prominent Rakhine nationalist historian who was part of the drafting 
committee:  
 
In 1978, while under the Burma Socialist Programme Party 
rule, me, Dr. Maung Maung [the late President and the chief 
legal adviser to General Ne Win], and U San Thar Aung105 
discussed a law on ethnic nationality . . . in the State Council 
                                                      
96  MARTIN SMITH, BURMA: INSURGENCY AND THE POLITICS OF ETHNICITY 98 (1991). 
97  See supra, Part III.A.1. 
98  See Interview with A.F.K. Jilani, supra note 37.   
99  Smith, supra note 13. 
100 See Interview with A.F.K. Jilani, supra note 37.      
101  EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST, UNRAVELLING ANOMALY 59 (2010), available at 
http://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/UNRAVELLING%20ANOMALY%20small%20file.p
df.  
102  See Interview with A.F.K. Jilani, supra note 37. 
103  Chris Lewa, North Arakan: An open prison for the Rohingya in Burma, FORCED MIGRATION 
REVIEW, http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR32/11-13.pdf p11. 
104  The late Aye Kyaw was a good friend of one of the authors.  He was extremely tradition-bound, 
ultra-nationalistic, and conservative.    
105  U San Thar Aung was a Rakhine nationalist who held the Director-General post in the Higher 
Education Department of the Ministry of Education in the 1980’s.  Dr. Maung Maung, originally a young 
military officer with the Burma Independence Army, was a London Lincoln Inn-trained barrister who 
became Ne Win’s chief legal counsel.  The Burmese co-author of this paper knew his family quite well.  
Like Maung Maung himself, two of his sons served in Ne Win’s army while his daughter worked as an 
intelligence agent attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  They are known for their unquestioning 
loyalty to General Ne Win and his family.    
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office . . . I suggested [using a survey from] the year of 1824, 
a turning point in Burmese history when the British annexed 
lower Burma.  Dr. Maung Maung agreed on that date, and we 
drafted a law that people living in Burma during 1824 were 
recognized as ethnic nationalities.  We found no such word as 
Rohingya in that survey.106 
 
From this statement, one can see that the discussion and decisions to 
legally define the ethnic groups of Burma took place in the aftermath of the 
mass exodus of Rohingya into Bangladesh in 1978.  Further, two Rakhine 
nationalists and General Ne Win’s legal counsel discussed and decided 
upon the omission of the Rohingya from citizenship rights based on one 
survey by the British colonialist—surveys which were extremely 
problematic.  The fact that the British census and other official records did 
not include the category Rohingya says more about the short-comings of 
British pre-World War II social-science methodologies and political and 
economic power relations during the British colonial period than they do 
about the history of Rohingya identity.107 
The 1982 Citizenship Act does not comply with international 
standards or Myanmar’s international legal obligations in several areas, the 
most relevant of which is that the 1982 Citizenship Act discriminates on 
the grounds of race.108  There has been international pressure to review or 
reform the 1982 Citizenship Act so as to base the acquisition of nationality 
on non-discriminatory criteria.  This reform would involve modifying the 
racial components of the law and respecting self-identification. 109  
However, the Myanmar government has been uncompromising on its 
decision to maintain the existing race-coded law, which government 
officials claim is widely supported by public opinion.110  In fact, the 
                                                      
106  An Historian looks at Rohingya: An interview with Dr Aye Kyaw, supra note 68. 
107  Anthony Irwin, a British Army Liaison Officer, noted: “(The Musulman Arakanese) are 
generally known as Bengalis or Chittagonians, . . . They resemble the Arab in name, in dress and in 
habit . . . As a race they have been here for over two hundred years . . . . They are living in a hostile 
country and have been for hundreds of years, and yet survive. They are perhaps to be compared with the 
Jews. A nation within a nation.”  ANTHONY IRWIN, BURMESE OUTPOST (1945). 
108  See, e.g., Burma Campaign UK, Burma’s Treatment of Rohingya and International Law, 
BURMA BRIEFING at 4, Apr. 2013, available at http://www.burmacampaign.org.uk/images/uploads/ 
Rohingya_and_International_Law.pdf. 
109  See Joint Statement One Year After the Violence Began: Civil Society Organizations Deeply 
Concerned by Human Rights and Humanitarian Situation of Stateless Rohingya, EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST 
(June 2013),  http://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/Joint%20Ngo%20Statement%20on%20 
Rohingya%20-%20June%202013.pdf (last visited May 24, 2014). 
110  In Foreign Minister Wunna Maung Lwin’s statement on September 13, 2013, to the UN Human 
Rights Council in Geneva, he stated, “It is necessary to understand the general sentiment of the people of 
Myanmar. While they are ready, and as it has been the case, to accept those who meet the criteria of the 
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racialization of the citizenship law, and the exclusion of the Rohingya 
enabled the specifically anti-Rohingya State (via the tight control that the 
State maintained over information and media) to widely instill in the 
Burmese population a rather virulent strain of twofold racism that is both 
anti-Muslim and anti-immigration.  Further, presidential rhetoric 
notwithstanding,111 there has been scant evidence that the government is 
actually moving toward a more inclusive definition of the national ethnic 
groups.112  
The Burmese military state’s encoding of anti-Indian racism in the 
body of its laws and policies, with roots in the colonial political economy 
of race relations,113 is a crucial mechanism through which the deliberate 
infliction of violence and physical destruction on the Rohingya is legalized 
and ideologically justified.  It is within this broader nexus of anti-Indian 
and anti-Muslim racism, and the Islamophobic state that effectively 
mobilized empirically false anti-immigration rhetoric against the Rohingya 
                                                                                                                                                             
1982 Citizenship Law as citizens, they do not accept the term ‘Rohingya’ which has never existed in the 
country's history.”  Statement by H.E. U Wunna Maung Lwin, Union Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of the Union of Myanmar, at the 24th Session of the UN Human Rights Council (Sept. 13, 
2013), available at http://myanmargeneva.org/pressrelease/fm%20statement%20at%20HRC_13.pdf.  
Maung Lwin’s most recent denial that the Rohingya are an ethnic people of Myanmar merely echoed a 
similar official stance made 20 years ago by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs U Ohn Gyaw.  In a 
Foreign Ministry press release dated February 26, 1992, Ohn Gyaw stated, “Historically, there has never 
been a ‘Rohingya’ race in Myanmar . . . . Since the first Anglo-Myanmar War in 1824, people of Muslim 
faith from the adjacent country illegally entered Myanmar Naing-Ngan, particularly Rakhine State.  
Being illegal immigrants they do not hold immigration papers like other nationals of the country.” Press 
Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Myan. (Feb. 26, 1992). See also, Comm’n on 
Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, Prepared by Mr. Yozo Yokota, 
Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, in accordance with Commission resolution 
1992/58 ¶ 41, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/37 (Feb. 17, 1993). 
111  Daniel Greenland, U Thein Sein's Vision For 'Inclusive National Identity’, MYANMAR TIMES, 
May 22, 2013, http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/6851-u-thein-sein-s-vision-for-
inclusive-national-identity.html.  
112  As a matter of fact, not only has Myanmar government failed to live up to its official rhetoric of 
moving towards a more inclusive society it is found to have ordered a recent wave of mass arrests of the 
Rohingya males above the age of ten in the Rohingya enclave named “Du Che Ra Dan.”  See Press 
Release, Fortify Rights, Myanmar: End Mass Arrests of Muslim Men and Boys in Rakhine State, Protect 
At-Risk Communities (Jan. 23, 2014), (available at http://www.fortifyrights.org/publications.html.)  
Quite the contrary, the Myanmar government attempted to cover up the recent massacre of the Rohingya, 
including women and children, involving government police and other security units.  Gerry Mullany, 
Report on Unrest Is at Odds With Account of Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/25/world/asia/un-says-muslims-were-massacred-in-tense-myanmar-
region.html. On the past failure of Myanmar’s reformist, quasi-civilian government, see Matthew Smith, 
Burma Lets the Rohingya Burn, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10000872396390443 792604577574731526546706. 
113  For a grounded analysis of the state-society interface in the production of Islamophobia and the 
violence against the Rohingya, see Maung Zarni, Buddhist Nationalism in Burma: Institutionalized 
Racism Against the Rohingya Muslims Led Burma to Genocide, TRICYCLE (2013), 
http://www.tricycle.com/feature/buddhist-nationalism-burma.  
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that this slow-burning process of Rohingya genocide needs to be 
situated.114   
III.  THE MECHANISMS OF SLOW-BURNING ROHINGYA GENOCIDE 
 This section examines four mechanisms through which genocidal 
acts against the Rohingya, with the intent to destroy the Rohingya as a 
group, in whole or in part, both physically and mentally, have been carried 
out.  First, the section discusses acts such as violence, forced migration, 
and illegalization.  Second, it takes a close look at the imposition of 
marriage and birth restrictions as population control measures intended to 
prevent the births of the new Rohingya.  Third, the discussion focuses on 
the ways in which the Burmese state attempts to deliberately destroy the 
social foundations of the Rohingya as an ethno-religious and national 
group, thereby inflicting on the Rohingya conditions of life calculated to 
bring about the group’s physical destruction.  Fourth and finally, the 
section examines the state’s decades-long efforts to intentionally destroy 
the Rohingya as a group through the erasure of their identity and history.   
A.   Violence, Forced Migration, and Illegalization Constitute Intent to 
Destroy the Rohingya  
 This section places violence, killing, forced migration, and 
illegalization in the context of the first three of the acts of genocide as 
defined in the 1948 Genocide Convention, namely intent to destroy the 
Rohingya through a) killing Rohingya people; b) causing serious bodily 
and mental harm to the Rohingya; and c) deliberately inflicting conditions 
of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the Rohingya. 
All three of these acts have been utilized against the Rohingya by the State 
and State-backed actors, most specifically ultra-nationalist local Buddhist 
Rakhine, since at least Operation Nagamin in 1978.  Since it came to 
power in 1962, the military government of Burma has become increasingly 
xenophobic.  Specifically, it turned anti-Muslim in its outlook and anti-
Rohingya in Rakhine state. 115   In the Rakhine state, the central 
government’s policies assumed a decidedly anti-Muslim character.   There 
the central authorities resorted to the simultaneous use of the three above-
mentioned genocidal acts in order to permanently remove the Rohingya 
from Myanmar territory and to destroy the Rohingya in Myanmar.  Violent 
                                                      
114  Id.  
115  In-depth interviews with a group of Burmese army veterans with non-Buddhist backgrounds, in 
US, UK, and ASEAN region (1995-2012).  
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attempts to force the Rohingya from Rakhine lands into Bangladesh have 
not succeeded because the exoduses in 1978 and in the early 1990s were 
each followed by large-scale forced repatriations of Rohingya.116  Thus, 
inside Myanmar, killings and violence against the Rohingya and the 
simultaneous illegalization of the Rohingya, have had a dual purpose—
both to effectuate the removal of the Rohingya from Rakhine and 
Myanmar (that forced migration failed to do) and to destroy the Rohingya 
as a group.   
Recent history has led to a state of affairs in which 800,000 
Rohingya have been pushed into three townships of North Rakhine State, 
which are subject to a different set of restrictive policies than the rest of 
Rakhine State.117  Additionally, since the 2012 violence, approximately 
140,000 Rohingya (who were either directly displaced by the violence or 
were subject to forced relocation by security forces under the rubric of 
protecting them from violence) have been contained in closed camps for 
Internally Displaced Persons (“IDP”) camps and subject to a whole set of 
restrictions that do not apply to the rest of the population of Rakhine 
State.118  These IDP camps and camp-like settings are fast becoming sites 
of protracted displacement and permanent segregation.119  In the IDPs 
where the Rohingya have been ghettoised, they  experience 
disproportionately more poverty, under-development, restrictive and 
discriminatory policies, and human rights abuses.120  Additionally, within 
these areas in which the Rohingya are contained, on-going attempts to 
control marriages and prevent births demonstrate the intention to destroy 
the Rohingya.121  Thus, the forced migration and forced population transfer 
of Rohingya results in ghettoization which intends to inflict group 
conditions of life that are calculated to bring about the groups destruction 
and cause serious bodily and mental harm on the group.  
This section considers how the processes of violence, forced 
migration, and the legitimization of those processes through the 
illegalization of the Rohingya since the 1970s has been used in a long-
running, slow-burning campaign to destroy the Rohingya as a group.  
 
                                                      
116  See supra, Part III.A. 
117  Interview with a group of Rohingya who were born and lived in this highly concentrated 
Rohingya community, in Kuala Lumpur and, via email, Rangoon.  
118  Id.  
119  Id.  
120  Interviews with two former UN staff, in Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia) and, via email, Sittwe, 
Rakhine (2013). 
121  Id.  
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1.   1978: The First Wave of Violence, Killings, Forced Migration and 
Illegalization 
 
Forced expulsion of Rohingya populations has occurred on a large-
scale since the 1970s.  At the end of 1977, the military junta launched an 
Operation known as Nagamin (“Operation Dragon King”) with the purpose 
of “designating citizens and foreigners in accordance with the law and 
taking actions against foreigners who have filtered into the country 
illegally.” 122   Operation Nagamin reached Rakhine State in February 
1978.123  Under this policy, many Rohingya were falsely accused of being 
illegal immigrants from Bangladesh and were detained and tortured. 
Rohingyas in Rakhine State had their official documentation taken away 
by inter-agency teams of inspectors.124  The operation degenerated into a 
widespread campaign of terror and violence against the Rohingya by 
hostile local populations and the State. 125  News of this treatment spread 
and over 200,000 panic-stricken Rohingya fled the country into the newly 
independent neighboring Bangladesh.126  This process of violence, terror, 
and forced migration of Rohingya was the first wave of ethnic cleansing 
and a clear indication of the intent to destroy the Rohingya.  The processes 
of illegalization and ghettoization of the Rohingya that followed Operation 
Nagamin further aimed to impose conditions of life on the Rohingya that 
would cause serious bodily and mental harm and destroy the Rohingya as a 
group. 
Forced repatriation of the Rohingya who fled to Bangladesh 
followed the exodus under a bilateral agreement between the governments 
of Bangladesh and Burma.127  To ensure repatriation, Bangladesh used 
coercive tactics and withheld food rations,128 leading to the death of 12,000 
refugees between June 1, 1978, and March 31, 1979. 129   Recently, 
Myanmar claimed that only 143,900 people had fled the country as part of 
Operation Nagamin while Bangladesh claimed the number to be 
                                                      
122  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BURMA: ROHINGYA MUSLIMS: ENDING A CYCLE OF EXODUS? 12 (Sept. 
1996) (quoting Statement by the Ministry for Home and Religious Affairs (Nov. 16, 1977)). 
123  William Mattern, Refugees: Burma’s Brand of Apartheid, 101 FAR E. ECON. REV. 31 (1978). 
124  See Interview with A.F.K. Jilani, supra note 37.  
125  Smith, supra note 13. 
126  Id.  
127 C.R. ABRAR, REPATRIATION OF ROHINGYA REFUGEES, (1995), available at http: 
//www.burmalibrary.org/docs/Abrar-repatriation.htm.  
128  ALAN C. LINDQUIST, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, REPORT ON THE 1978-
1979 BANGLADESH REFUGEE RELIEF OPERATION (June 1979).  
129  Id.  
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252,000.130  In all, 187,250 Rohingya were forcibly returned to Burma 131  
This discrepancy in numbers arose due to the manipulation of figures as 
the states involved attempted to disown the Rohingya.132  It further fed into 
the popular perception in Myanmar of illegal infiltration by Bengalis, as 
the population of Myanmar was led to believe that it was not Rohinya that 
returned to Myanmar, but illegal Bengali immigrants who arrived as 
evidenced by the discrepancy in figures.133 
Since the devastating impact of the events of 1978-79 to the present 
day, current forced evictions of the Rohingya from Myanmar are in full 
knowledge that the conditions and journeys outside the country may 
threaten many lives.  As such, forced migration is more than simply the 
removal of the Rohingya from the land, but is part of a deliberate process 
of destruction of the Rohingya people. 
 
2.  The 1980s: Illegalization and Conditions Imposed on the Rohingya 
are Calculated to Bring About Their Destruction and Cause 
Physical and Mental Harm 
  
The 1982 Citizenship Act stripped the Rohingya of their nationality 
and led to the creation of the security-legal framework built around their 
statelessness.  The fact that the Rohingya populations are found in 
recognizably Rohingya pockets (albeit alongside non-Rohingya local 
communities such as the Buddhist Rakhines) primarily in the northernmost 
districts of the state, and to a lesser extent throughout the Rakhine state, 
facilitated the state’s plan to turn these targeted communities into security 
grids.  Using the 1982 Citizenship Act, which strips a large percentage of 
the Rohingya of their citizenship status, that is, rendering the population 
illegal,134 the state was able to place and enforce draconian restrictions on 
                                                      
130  These numbers are based on Bangladesh and Myanmar government statistics cited in C.R. 
ABRAR, supra note 127.  See also, THE GOV’T OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR, RAKHINE 
INQUIRY COMMISSION REPORT (Apr. 29, 2013) (in Burmese) (on file with the author).  The original 
Burmese version was released on April 29, 2013 and the English version was released only in August 
2013.  Both versions are on file with the authors.  
131  Based on Bangladesh and Myanmar government statistics cited in C.R. ABRAR, supra note 127.  
See also, THE GOV’T OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR, supra note 130.  The original 
Burmese version was released on April 29, 2013 and the English version was released only in August 
2013.    Both versions are on file with the authors. 
132  C.R. ABRAR, supra note 127.  
133  Id.  
134  According to the Immigration Minister and ex-police chief Khin Yi, out of a total of 1.33 
million Ronhingya, only 40,000 of them hold Myanmar citizenship or are considered legally present.  See 
Szep & Marshall, supra note 9.  
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the everyday lives of Rohingya through these security grids.135  The United 
Nations considers the Rohingya “one of the most persecuted groups in the 
world;” they are the only ethnic group in Burma who are barred from 
having more than two children, and subject to arbitrary mass arrests and 
chronic waves of massacres.136  
The 1982 Citizenship Act is not simply a legal mechanism through 
which the Rohingya experience systematic and legalized discrimination; 
rather it is the “anchor”137 that holds in place the discriminatory legal 
framework designed to severely cripple the Rohingya as a group by falsely 
deemed illegals and non-citizens.  These draconian locally-implemented 
policies include travel restrictions (e.g., restricting travel without 
permission to neighboring village tracts, restricting all travel beyond the 
three townships of North Rakhine State), restrictions on marriages and 
cohabitation, and restrictions on access to education and healthcare.138  
This legal framework has served to impoverish the population and leave 
them vulnerable to systematic and wide-spread extortion, abuse, and 
exploitation.139  The lack of legal protection for non-citizens, together with 
the implementation of local policies and a dysfunctional judicial system, 
deemed to have failed even minimalist models of the rule of law,140 govern 
the lives of the Rohingya in North Rakhine State, rendering everyday 
activities illegal and thus allowing free-reign for extortion, abuse, 
impunity, and wide-spread human rights abuses.141   For instance, the 
country lacks any guarantee of fundamental rights and freedoms, displays 
extremely weak administrative enforcement of regulations, and does not 
allow sufficient nongovernmental checks on power. 142   The set of 
discriminatory laws that deny the Rohingya their fundamental rights has 
also served over the past decades to destroy the social foundations of the 
Rohingya ethnic group, legitimizing and actively encouraging 
                                                      
135 Interviews with the three members of the Rakhine Violence Inquiry Commission, by phone and 
face-to-face in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (Fall 2012).    
136  Associated Press in Yangon, UN Urges Burma to Investigate Rohingya Deaths After Latest 
Violence, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 24, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/24/un-burma-
investgate-rohingya-deaths-violence.  
137  ZAWACKI, supra note 16.  
138  Lewa, supra note 79.  
139  See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, MYANMAR: THE ROHINGYA MINORITY: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
DENIED  27 (May 2004), available at http://amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA16/005/2004/en/9e8bb8db-
d5d5-11dd-bb24-1fb85fe8fa05/asa160052004en.pdf. 
140  Nick Cheesman, Thin Rule of Law or Un-Rule of Law in Myanmar?, 82 PAC. AFF. 597 (2009). 
141  Lewa, supra note 79, at 12.  
142  Andrew D. Kaspar, Burma Fares Poorly in Global Rule of Law Gauge, THE IRRAWADDY, Mar. 
6, 2014, http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/burma-fares-poorly-global-rule-law-gauge.html.  
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discrimination and abuses against the Rohingya by both civilians and state 
actors, such as the security forces.   
The 1982 Citizenship Act serves as the state’s legal and ideological 
foundation143 on which all forms of violence, execution, restrictions, and 
human rights crimes are justified and committed with state impunity if 
carried out horizontally by the local ultra-nationalist Rakhine Buddhists.  
In light of the on-the-ground link between the legalized removal of 
citizenship from the Rohingya144 and the implementation of a permanent 
set of draconian laws and policies—as opposed to periodic “anti-
immigration” operations—amount to the infliction on the Rohingya of 
conditions of life designed to bring about serious bodily and mental harm 
and to destroy the group in whole or in part.  As such, the illegalization of 
the Rohingya in Myanmar is an indication of the intent of the State to both 
remove the Rohingya permanently from their homeland and to destroy the 
Rohingya as a group. 
 
3. The 1990s and 2000s: Continuing Abuses and the Role of the 
NaSaKa Security Forces in Causing Serious Bodily and Mental 
Harm to the Rohingya with the Intent to Destroy them as a Group 
 
The Rohingya have experienced additional waves of large-scale 
violence and forced migration since the late 1970s, including between May 
1991 and March 1992,145 in 2001,146 and again in 2012.147   Each of these 
examples of large-scale violence has taken place against on-going daily 
experiences of human rights abuses, including arbitrary arrests and 
execution, enforced disappearances, torture, and rape.148 
In the 1980s and 1990s, nation-wide unrest triggered by decades of 
repressive military rule, the failure of economic policies and resultant 
hardships, and the regime’s refusal to stand by the results of the 1990 
elections in which NLD won a landslide victory, led to a continuous 
tightening of already harsh measures to control dissent across Myanmar.149  
Against this backdrop, the junta increased the military presence along the 
                                                      
143  ZAWACKI, supra note 16, at 18-19.  
144  See supra, Part II.B. 
145  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 122; U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, REPORT ON THE 
ROHINGYA REPATRI, THE RETURN OF THE ROHINGYA REFUGEES TO BURMA: VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION 
OR REFOULEMENT? 14 (March 1995).  
146  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 17, at 16.  
147  See EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST, supra note 23.  
148  Id. at 12. 
149  Jayshree Bajoria, Understanding Myanmar, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jun. 21, 2013), 
http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/understanding-myanmar/p14385 (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).  
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border with Bangladesh and in all the border areas of Myanmar in an 
attempt to sever dissidents from external support and shore up the 
borders.150  With the build-up came increased demands for land and labor, 
resulting in land confiscations, forced evictions, forced labor, as well as 
torture and rape perpetrated by the security forces (“NaSaKa”).151  While 
these abuses occurred extensively elsewhere in minority areas and affected 
many populations of Myanmar, including the Rakhine Buddhists, they 
disproportionately affected the Rohingya, whose legal and social status 
made them easy targets, especially since the military and local civilian 
population already subjected them to discrimination and abuse.152   
The State-sponsored abuses that the NaSaKa perpetuated indicate 
the intent to destroy the Rohingya.  The establishment of the NaSaKa as a 
military border force in 1992 as part of the militarization of Myanmar’s 
border areas came hand in hand with the imposition of severe physical 
movement and marriage restrictions, increased extortion, and abuse.153  
The abuses resulting from the establishment and role of the NaSaKa, 
caused another acute outflow of some 250,000 Rohingya, about thirty 
percent of the total Rohingya population of North Arakan, who left for 
Bangladesh in 1992 and 1993.154  Figures indicating the scale of the 
killings and abuses by the NaSaKa are not available due to the lack of 
documentation.  Despite this lack, several factors indicate that the severe 
bodily and mental harms suffered by the Rohingya during the early 1990s 
occurred with the intent to destroy the Rohingya.  These severe abuses 
included “razed villages, mass rapes and extrajudicial killings.”155  The 
NUI Galway report used the evidence collected elsewhere in Myanmar’s 
ethnic minority areas on summary and arbitrary executions and killings as 
                                                      
150  IRISH CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, NAT’L UNIV. OF IR. AT GALWAY, CRIMES AGAINST 
HUMANITY IN WESTERN BURMA: THE SITUATION OF THE ROHINGYA 92 (2010), 
http://www.nuigalway.ie/media/intranet/Crimes-Against-Humanit-in-Western -Burma.pdf; HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 122.  
151  IRISH CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 150.  
152  The anti-Rohingya sentiment was widespread among the dominant Buddhist Rakhine or 
Arakanese and they were typically mistreated by local security units in Western Burma even before the 
State launched its official large-scale campaign in 1978 to terrorize the Rohingya and drive them out of 
Western Burma.  See The Oppression of Rakhine Muslims (i.e., Rohingya), 5 LIGHT OF THE WORLD 54 
(1957).   This Burmese language article describes the mistreatment of the Rohingya nationalities at the 
hands of the local Rakhine authorities while the former looked the other way when Rakhine Buddhists 
from across the then East Pakistan to come and settle in Western Burma.  Id.   
153  EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST, supra, note 101, at 96.  
154  Id.  
155  Francis Wade, Abolishing Burma’s Feared Border Force: PR or Reform?, ASIAN 
CORRESPONDENT (July 15, 2013), http://asiancorrespondent.com/110670/abolishing-burmas-feared-
border-force-pr-or-reform/.   
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part of forced labour practices to estimate the severity of these abuses.156 
However, the Rohingya have suffered disproportionately to other ethnic 
minorities in terms of forced labour and associated abuses including 
killing, forced disappearances, arbitrary arrests, and associated human 
rights abuses.157 According to the NUI Galway researchers:  
 
During the course of the field investigation for this Report, a 
number of accounts were provided of incidents in which 
agencies of the SPDC [State Peace and Development Council, 
the then ruling military council], usually the NaSaKa [or the 
inter-agency security and intelligence division under direct 
control of the Military], were allegedly responsible for the 
discriminate killing of Rohingya residents in North Arakan 
State.  Examples ranged from deaths resulting from the use of 
live ammunition to disperse gatherings of Rohingyas to 
individual accounts of family members being beaten to death 
while performing forced labour….[Despite being unable to 
verify the information] it is nevertheless obvious from all 
sources that discriminate killings are taking place in North 
Arakan State.  They may be referred to as discriminate simply 
because the vast majority of reported incidents flowing out of 
Arakan State (for example, as highlighted by HRDU  [Human 
Rights Documentation Unit]) overwhelmingly involve 
Rohingya victims.158  
 
The state backing of the abuses through the establishment of the NaSaKa, 
the law and policy framework that institutionalised the discriminatory 
nature of the abuses, and the disproportionate manner in which the 
Rohingya experienced the abuses indicate intent to destroy.159 
In 1994, after the United Nations High Commission on Refugees 
(“UNHCR”) was granted access to North Rakhine State, mass repatriations 
of some 236,000 Rohingya took place, even though there had not been 
significant improvement in the human rights situation.160  The repatriations 
                                                      
156  IRISH CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 150.  
157  Id.  
158  Id. at 124.   
159  The New Republic uses the term “concentration camps” in a recent article about the plight of 
the Rohingya (vis-à-vis other oppressed minorities in Burma), indicating the severity of the Rohingya 
situation.  See Graeme Wood, A Countryside of Concentration Camps, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 21, 2014, 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/116241/burma-2014-countryside-concentration-camps.  
160  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 122.  
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were involuntary and Bangladesh security forces used excessive force to 
make Rohingya return.161  Neither the Rakhine Burmese population not the 
Myanmar government considered the returnees to be citizens, and the 
popular conflation of Rohingyas with illegal Bengali immigrants was 
further entrenched by returnees having spent time outside the country.  The 
then-Minister for Foreign Affairs, U Ohn Gyaw, stated to the UN Special 
Rapporteur in December 1992:  “it is a rubbish thing that people have left 
Myanmar.  These people who are in the refugee camps in Bangladesh are 
perhaps from Dhaka, but not one single person has left Burma.”162  This 
statement is a blatant denial of the Rohingya’s existence and rights in 
Myanmar, and part and parcel of the processes of ethnic cleansing and 
destruction of the Rohingya as a group through denial of their rights and 
identity. 
The decades that followed saw a steady and significant outflow of 
Rohingya from Rakhine State suffering from the same abuses that they had 
suffered in the early 1990s.  In Bangladesh, only the refugees who were in 
the UNHCR-administered camps prior to the repatriations of the 1990s are 
allowed to be registered and reside within the camps today—this number is 
around 29,000.163  A further 200,000 to 300,000 people reside in make-shift 
sites outside the official camps, many of whom were forcibly repatriated to 
Myanmar in the 1990s, and made their way back to Bangladesh at some 
point.164  This population has no access to protection or humanitarian aid 
and lives in squalid and dangerous conditions on the margins of society.165  
They are unable to return to Myanmar as they have been deleted from 
household family lists by state security forces and local administrators and 
would be subject to arrest as illegal immigrants on their return.166  Their 
dire existence in Bangladesh is a testament to the fact that their existence is 
only possible outside of Myanmar.   
Again in 2001 and 2002, different waves of violence against the 
Rohingya occurred.  Mobs made up of local Rakhine Buddhists violently 
                                                      
161  Id.   
162  U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, supra note 110.  
163 Interviews with a UN official, and local NGO staffers Cox Bazaar, in Bangladesh (Spring 2010).   
164  U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees Policy Dev. & Evaluation Serv., States of Denial: A Review of 
UNHCR’s Response to the Protracted Situation of Stateless Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh, 2, 
PDES/2011/13 (Dec. 2011) (by Esther Kiragu, Angela Li Rosi & Tim Morris) available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/4ee754c19.html. 
165  PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STATELESS AND STARVING, PERSECUTED ROHINGYA FLEE 
BURMA AND STARVE IN BANGLADESH (Mar. 2010), https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/stateless-
and-starving.pdf. 
166  Interviews with a Group of Rohingya Refugees and Expatriates, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 
(2013).  
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attacked the Rohingya in places like Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine State.  A 
total of twenty-eight mosques and Madrasas were destroyed and an 
unknown number of Rohingya were killed.167  The government’s security 
forces did nothing to protect the Rohingya and in many instances they took 
part in the violence against them, 168  indicating that the state was 
deliberately inflicting conditions of violence and insecurity on the 
Rohingya that were calculated to bring about their destruction.  In 
interpreting the behavior of the State, it is extremely important to 
understand that all actions of political and societal significance are, with no 
exception, carried out either by direct orders from the highest level of the 
(military) leadership or with a tacit approval on the part of the senior-most 
leadership.169  Either way, all perpetrators of violence against the Rohingya 
have enjoyed impunity since the first large scale campaign of violence 
against the Rohingya began in 1978, which speaks volumes about the 
instrumental role the state and its leaderships have played in the 
destruction of the Rohingya and creation of life-destroying conditions for 
these people as a group.170       
 
4.   The 2012 Pogroms: Civilian-military Violence, Denial of Aid, Social 
and Economic Boycotts, and Hate Campaigns are Designed to Kill, 
Cause Serious Bodily and Mental Harm, and Deliberately Inflict 
Conditions of Life Calculated to Destroy the Rohingya 
 
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the military played a central role 
in perpetrating and encouraging violence and abuses against the Rohingya 
with the intent to both remove them from Myanmar and to inflict serious 
harm and conditions of life on them with the intent to destroy them.  In 
2010, political and economic reforms brought a nominally civilian 
government to power under ex-general President Thein Sein.171   The 
opening of societal space and the emerging media freedoms that came with 
these reforms changed the dynamics, but not the nature of the destruction 
of the Rohingya.  Post-2010, state-based propaganda continued and was 
                                                      
167  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 17.  
168  Id.   
169 See (Burmese Language) Interviews with ex-General Khin Nyunt, Chief of the Directorate of 
Defense Services Intelligence (1988-2004) and Prime Minister (2003-04), a book-length series of 
interviews with the formerly third ranking and powerful general, Rangoon,  Nov. 2013.    
170  Maung Zarni, Religious Violence and the Role of the State, in MYANMAR IN TRANSITION: 
POLITY, PEOPLE AND PROCESSES 83, 83-91 (Kerstin Duell ed., 2013), available at 
http://www.kas.de/politikdialog-asien/en/publications/36387/.  
171  Profile: Burma President Thein Sein, BBC (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
asia-pacific-12358204. 
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complemented by wide-spread popular hate campaigns and organized and 
state-backed violence against the Rohingya by Rakhine Buddhist mobs that 
escalated in 2012.172  The events that occurred in 2012 were the first 
abuses against the Rohingya that human rights organizations were able to 
effectively document based on findings and interviews inside Rakhine 
State.173  The 2012 violence saw a mixture of state authorities, civilian 
mobs, and local populations killing and engaging in the mass physical 
destruction of Rohingya (and other Muslim people, properties, and 
communities)—effectively enacting pogroms against the Rohingya.174  
While the government of Myanmar, some UN agencies, and some of 
the international community continue to label the violence as communal 
and sectarian, the body of evidence collected from human rights 
organisations shows that the State and its security forces played a vital role 
in the physical destruction of Rohingya people, properties, and 
communities during the 2012 violence.175  Beyond simply implicating the 
State in this destruction, the role of the security forces in the violence, 
together with the institutionalization of discrimination and abuse against 
the Rohingya, indicates that the killings, violence, and hate campaigns 
were planned, organized, and perpetrated with the purpose of both driving 
out the Rohingya and destroying them.  The fact that state security forces 
both engaged with and allowed the violence and hate campaigns to happen, 
indicates a deliberate intention to create conditions of life calculated to 
bring about the destruction of the Rohingya. 
While the government of Myanmar places the numbers killed by the 
violence in 2012 at 192,176 these numbers are highly disputed and it is 
                                                      
172 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 17.   
173  Interview with a prominent human rights researcher in Kuala Lampur, Maylasia, Fall 2013.  In 
terms of the substance of popular hate speech in Myanmar it is decidedly Muslim-phobic.  There is a 
widespread fear that the country’s Muslims who make up an estimated four to five percent of the 
country’s total are waging a jihad against the Buddhist population estimated at eighty to ninety percent of 
the total population.  The jihad is aimed at turning the predominantly Buddhist Myanmar into an Islamic 
country.  Further, the demonization of the country’s Muslims often involves painting them as an 
extension of radical Islamic organizations such as the Taliban or Al Quaeda.   Both the leading anti-
Muslim Buddhist monks and Myanmar President’s spokespersons have been found to have used these 
narratives publicly—in their Burmese language Facebook postings, which appear to be timed with 
erupting violence against the Rohingya and the Muslims.   The hate-speech materials used for the article 
are on file with the authors.  Some on-line hate-speech (in English translation) can be viewed at 
http://www.maungzarni.net/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2014).       
174  Burma: The Plight of the Rohingya, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM’L MUSEUM, http://www.ushmm.org/ 
confront-genocide/cases/burma (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).  See also, Samantha Michaels, Burma Govt 
Accused of Ethnic Cleansing Against Rohingya Muslims, THE IRRAWADDY (Apr. 22, 2013), 
http://www.irrawaddy.org/rohingya/burma-govt-accused-of-ethnic-cleansing-against-rohingya-
muslims.html.   
175  Id.  
176  THE GOV’T OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR, supra note 130, at 20.  
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likely that they grossly under-estimate the number of people killed.177  
Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) documented four mass graves related to 
the violence of 2012 and villagers reported being forced to dig mass 
graves.178  HRW found that in one village alone, in Mrauk-U district, at 
least 70 Rohingya were killed in a massacre. 179  In addition to the killings, 
whole villages and communities were razed and destroyed.180  Satellite 
images of the destruction clearly show that whole Muslim areas were 
completely destroyed while Buddhist areas were left relatively 
untouched.181  
The pogroms were systematic and widespread.  HRW described the 
attacks as: 
 
…organized, incited, and committed by local Arakanese 
[Rakhine] 182  political party operatives, the Buddhist 
monkhood, and ordinary Arakanese, at times directly 
supported by state security forces.  Rohingya men, women, 
and children were killed, some were buried in mass graves, 
and their villages and neighborhoods were razed.  While the 
state security forces in some instances intervened to prevent 
violence and protect fleeing Muslims, more frequently they 
stood aside during attacks or directly supported the assailants, 
committing killings and other abuses.  In the months since the 
violence, the Burmese government of President Thein Sein 
has taken no serious steps to hold accountable those 
responsible or to prevent future outbreaks of violence.183 
 
In many cases, State security forces were aware of the attacks before they 
took place.184  In some cases, Rohingya were forcibly evicted from their 
homes and placed in IDP camps by security forces.  The alleged 
justification for these evictions was protection from supposedly coming 
                                                      
177 See, e.g., Inside Burma’s Forbidden Camps, CHANNEL 4 NEWS (Aug. 14, 2012), 
http://www.channel4.om/news/inside-burmas-forbidden-camps.  
178  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 17, at 7.  
179  See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28.  
180  Id.  
181  Id.  
182  Arakanese is an adjective denoting the people or language of Arakan.  We use it 
interchangeably with Rakhine. 
183  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 17, at 4.  
184  Interview with U Nyunt Maung Shein and U Tin Maung Than, two Muslim members of the 
Presidential Inquiry Commission on the Sectarian Violence in Rakhine, in Kualar Lumpur, Malaysia 
(April 2013). 
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violence.  In other cases, Rohingya were disarmed ahead of violent attacks, 
leaving them defenseless.185   
Since 2012, violence, fuelled by systems of impunity, targeted at 
Muslim communities has been on-going in Rakhine State and has spread to 
other areas of the country, targeting Muslim communities.186  In September 
2013, the UN Special Rapporteur raised the issue of impunity in relation to 
Rohingya violence in Rakhine State, noting: 
 
In view of the consistent and credible reports of widespread 
and systematic human rights violations carried out by security 
forces that the Special Rapporteur has received, he remains 
concerned that the perpetrators of such violations have not 
been held to account. This culture of impunity is 
particularly troubling given the vulnerability and 
marginalization of the members of the Rohingya community 
owing to their lack of legal status in the country.187 
 
The State’s refusal to address the issues of impunity in relation to the 
Rohingya in Rakhine State, even on the urging of the international 
community and human rights bodies,188 creates conditions within which 
the central state allows the serious bodily and mental harm inflicted on the 
Rohingya to continue and to spread, with the effect of condoning and 
directly contributing to the physical destruction of the Rohingya people. 
                                                      
185  Id.  See also, Burma: End “Ethnic Cleansing” of Rohingya Muslims, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
(Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/22/burma-end-ethnic-cleansing-rohingya-muslims.  
186  For example, violence spread to Thandwe, Rakhine State in October 2013.  A crowd of over 
1000 Rakhine surrounded a Muslim village, killing at least seven, including a ninety-four year-old 
woman; destroying three mosques and 112 homes; and displacing almost 500 people.  See Shibani 
Mahtani & Myo Myo, Myanmar Town Locked Down After Violence; President Continues Trip, WALL ST. 
J. (Oct. 2, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230490670457911065363 
7143812.  
187 U.N. Secretary-General, Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, 12, U.N. Doc.  A/68/397 (Sept. 
23, 2013), available at reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A-68-397_SR report September 
2013 (1).pdf.  
188  For instance, as recent as December 30, 2013, the European Union, the United States, Turkey, 
and Switzerland registered publicly their “deep concerns” about the “inhumane environment” for the 
Rohingya internally displaced persons (“IDPs”) and the Myanmar government’s unfulfilled promises to 
take “effective actions” to rectify the “dire humanitarian situations.”  See Myebon Joint Mission 
Statement from the Embassies of Switzerland, the Republic of Turkey, the United States of America, and 
the European Union, RELIEFWEB (Dec. 30, 2013), http://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myebon-joint-
mission-statement-december-2013 (last visited May 24, 2014).  Although the official statement of 
concern is specific to the situation of the IDPs at a camp named Myebon in Rakhine State, there is a 
pervasive concern among all the external players including U.N. agencies and human rights research 
organizations, according to our findings.   
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Notwithstanding the scale of the killings, elements of the attacks and 
killings indicate that these acts of violence were part of a process intended 
to destroy the Rohingya people both as individuals and as a group, as well 
as drive them from their lands.  For example, the attacks were 
accompanied by anti-Rohingya campaigns implemented by local political 
parties, the Buddhist Sangha (“Order”), the security forces, and local 
populations. 189   The campaigns did not simply spread anti-Rohingya 
hatred, but included a series of targeted boycotts by Buddhists against 
trading, helping, working with, or fraternizing with Muslims.190  In some 
cases, Rakhine Buddhists accused of trading or helping Rohingya were 
publically humiliated and paraded around in public wearing “traitor” 
signs.191  These campaigns aimed to socially and economically ostracize 
Muslims192 and put them in famine-like situations.193  The combination of 
sustained tactics indicates that the violence was not simply spontaneous or 
sporadic, and neither was it simply intercommunal or sectarian as has been 
characterized by the media, foreign governments, and the U.N.194  Such 
boycotts accompanied by the violent pogroms are designed to inflict 
conditions of life on Rohingya communities calculated to bring about their 
physical destruction through dangerous and famine-like conditions. 
Additionally, there were organized protests against the delivery of 
humanitarian aid to Rohingya in emergency situations and Myanmar 
government attempted to cut off aid completely to the Rohingya. 195 
Security forces arrested humanitarian workers, including U.N. workers196 
                                                      
189  See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 17, at 6-8.  See also, personal communications with 
three members of Myanmar’s official Rakhine Violence Inquiry Commission, including U Nyunt Maung 
Shein, U Tin Maung Than and Zargana, (2012 and 2013).  
190  Interview with the Rohingya from Sittwe, in Kualar Lumpur, Malaysia (Dec. 2013).  
191  Id.  
192  U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 187.  
193  Even those housed in the camps covered by humanitarian aid agencies are suffering from acute 
malnutrition.  According to the revised Rakhine Response Plan, published in August 2013, acute 
malnutrition rates in the camps around Sittwe remain at 14.4% with further deterioration expected in 
rural camps.  See U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Rakhine Response Plan 
(Myanmar) July 2012—December 2013, 12, RELIEFNET, http://reliefweb.int/sites/relief 
web.int/files/resources/Snapshot_Rakrhine_UNOCHA_12_Aug2013.pdf.  
194 For a typical false characterization of this state-sponsored and state-backed violence, see INT’L 
CRISIS GRP, supra note 19 (examining the instrumental role of the State in Burma in the violence and 
killings of the Rohingya).  
195  Jane Perlez, Death Stalks Muslims as Myanmar Cuts Off Aid, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/03/world/asia/death-stalks-muslims-as-myanmar-cuts-off-
aid.html?_r=0.  
196 Press Release, U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Statement of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myan. (Aug. 4 2012), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12405&LangID=E.  
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and threatened others with violence. 197   A Medecins Sans Frontier 
(“MSF”), or Doctors Without Borders, as they are known in the United 
States, press statement noted:  
 
Due to the fear staff have as a result of sustained intimidation 
and threats against MSF workers by some members of the 
Rakhine community, doctors and other essential personnel are 
too scared to work in Rakhine State, and thus MSF faces a 
shortage in staff, a gap that is still not being filled by the 
government or other organizations.198 
 
State security forces have not effectively dealt with these threats to local 
staff and agencies assisting the Rohingya.  In fact, bureaucratic barriers 
relating to the displaced Rohingya population at both the central and local 
levels prevented, and continue to prevent, humanitarian workers from 
accessing vulnerable communities in urgent need of humanitarian relief.199  
Campaigns, protests, and boycotts against the delivery of life-saving 
humanitarian aid for the Rohingya are also designed to physically destroy 
the Rohingya through the denial of food, water, and healthcare.  In a 
significant development, in late February 2014, Myanmar government 
forced the Doctors Without Borders, which had been treating tens of 
thousands of individuals in Rakhine state, but primarily the Rohingya, 
displaced by the waves of violence and put in camps, to cease all 
operations in Myanmar.200  
The combined tactics of killings, violence, destruction of property 
and communities, accompanied by social and economic boycotts and hate 
campaigns against the Rohingya, are perceived by Rohingya communities 
both at home and in exile, as concerted state-backed attempts to destroy the 
Rohingya or drive them from their lands in Rakhine State. 201   The 
Rohingya are, in effect, given a stark choice between starvation, death, or 
                                                      
197  The Ongoing Humanitarian Emergency in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, DOCTORS WITHOUT 
BORDERS (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/article/ongoing-humanitarian-
emergency-myanmars-rakhine-state?id=6624&cat=field-news.  
198  Id.  
199  U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, supra note 193, at 13.  
200  Alexandra Zavis, Myanmar Orders Doctors Without Borders to Cease Operations, L.A. TIMES, 
Feb. 28, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-myanmar-orders-doctors-without-
borders-to-cease-operations-20140228,0,2115340.story.  
201 Interviews with Rohingya communities leaders working with new refugee arrivals in Malaysia 
including Interview with Abdul Hamid Bin Musa Ali, supra note 37.  
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leaving their lands in Rakhine State.202  One Rohingya man from Min Bya 
explained the situation as follows:  
 
Since the first week in June, things changed. There was a total 
ban on movement for us. The Rakhine came with the 
authorities and surrounded our village. We cannot go out from 
the village and I cannot get any income to support my family. 
If we go out from the village the Rakhine chase us. There are 
cases where our Rohingya people left the village to find fish 
or vegetables – they have been killed. There are seven men 
that were killed from my village in this way. Since June all the 
police were changed in our area. They changed the battalion. 
They also sent a lot of extra police. They do not protect us. 
One Rohingya man was shot by the police when he was 
getting in his canoe to try to get something. They shot him in 
the head. His family went to pick up the body. . . There was 
not enough food.   People could not get medical treatment 
because the only medical care is in the nearby town and we 
were not allowed to go to town. Several people died in my 
village because there was no treatment. They died from 
starvation.   Look at my body. Look how thin I am. You can 
see how much I suffer from hunger.203 
 
Another Rohingya from a village in Maungdaw, North Rakhine State, 
described the situation six months on from the outbreak of violence in 
2012: 
 
I am married and I have 5 children. For our livelihoods, our 
family would cultivate paddy and other things, and we also 
kept cattle. Our income from our farm was enough to support 
our family before the violence began this year in June.  Since 
June, there was a boycott on trading and interacting with 
Rohingya and our movements are so restricted.  We cannot 
even go out to our farmland to cultivate our crops and get 
food. Everybody in my house is crying for assistance. They 
are so hungry. They cannot eat every day. They try to make 
                                                      
202  Interviews with Rohingya communities leaders working with new refugee arrivals in Malaysia 
including Interview with Abdul Hamid Bin Musa Ali, supra note 37.  
203 Interview by the author for Equal Rights Trust with Rohingya (December 2012). 
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the stock of rice they have last for as long as possible, so 
everybody in the house just eats once in two days.204   
 
Such accounts indicate that the intention is not only to remove the 
Rohingya from their land, but also to destroy them by denying access to 
food and basic services.  
 According to the Article 2(c) of the Genocide Convention of 1948, 
deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical 
destruction is one of the five acts of genocide.  The three specific readings 
of the aforementioned Article in the context of various international 
tribunals, namely Yugoslavia and Rwanda, may shed further light on the 
need for precisions when it comes to charges of genocide.  Among these 
past international readings directly relevant to Myanmar’s persecution of 
the Rohingya are: 
 
1.  “[T]he expression deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of 
life calculated to bring about its physical destructions in whole or in 
part, should be construed as the methods of destruction by which 
the perpetrator does not immediately kill the members of the group, 
but which, ultimately, seek their physical destruction.”205 
 
2. “‘Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part’ under sub-
paragraph (c) does not require proof of a result. The acts envisaged 
by this sub-paragraph include, but are not limited to, methods of 
destruction apart from direct killings such as subjecting the group to 
a subsistence diet, systematic expulsion from homes and denial of 
the right to medical services. Also included is the creation of 
circumstances that would lead to a slow death, such as lack of 
proper housing, clothing and hygiene or excessive work or physical 
exertion.”206  
 
                                                      
204  Id.  
205  Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 505 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
Rwanda Sept. 2, 1998), http://www.refworld.org/docid/40278fbb4.html. 
206  Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 507 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stakic/tjug/en/stak-tj030731e.pdf (quoted 
in an internal brief specifically written for and circulated among the panel of judges at the Permanent 
People’s Tribunal on Sri Lank (http://ptsrilanka.org/), Germany, Dec 2013.  See the memo here:  
http://www.maungzarni.net/2014/01/elements-of-genocide-foundational.html). 
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3. “Therefore the conditions of life envisaged include rape, the 
starving of a group of people, reducing required medical services 
below a minimum, and withholding sufficient living 
accommodation for a reasonable period, provided the above would 
lead to the destruction of the group in whole or in part.”207 
 
Indeed the evidence presented so far indicates that the widespread nature, 
the systematic pattern and types of persecution of the Rohingya by 
Myanmar amounts to genocide. 
 
5.   Post-2012 Pogrom Displacement: Ghettoization through IDP Camps 
Perpetuates Apartheid Arrangement of Rohingya’s Existence in 
Myanmar 
 
Forced displacement of the Rohingya is designed to permanently 
ghettoize them by segregating them and applying a whole set of policies 
and conditions of life that only apply to them and other Muslims contained 
in certain geographical areas.  Segregation and discriminatory laws, 
policies, and conditions of life that have been applied to the Rohingya in 
the townships of North Rakhine State over the past two decades can be 
considered ghettoization.  In addition, the discriminatory conditions and 
restrictions that Rohingya face when forcibly transferred off their land into 
camps for IDP camps are also best described as ghettoization, particularly 
as it is fast becoming a situation of protracted segregation and 
displacement.  These camps for the internally displaced have been used to 
legalize and legitimize a system of apartheid based on ghettoization. 
According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (“UNOCHA”), in Rakhine state, 140,000 people—
the bulk of whom are Rohingya—have been displaced in the two waves of 
mass violence in June and October 2012.208  Many of them have been 
segregated in closed and guarded camps across Rakhine State.209  While 
many of the Rakhine who were displaced by the violence in 2012 have 
been able to return to their villages, the government has not allowed, much 
                                                      
207  Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment 
(Reasons), ¶ 116 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda May 21, 1999). 
208  Conversations between the authors and international humanitarian staff based in Myanmar 
(names and organizations withheld).   
209  Rushanara Ali, Burma’s Rohingya: A Story of Segregation and Desperation, THE GUARDIAN, 
June 3, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/jun/03/burma-
rohingya-segregation.  
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less facilitated, the return of the Rohingya to their homes.210  The fear 
among many of the humanitarian staff working in the area is that if the 
Rohingya are not returned soon—at least within the next year, of which 
they have little hope—segregation will become permanent. 211   In 
September 2013, the Sentinel Project noted:  
 
The proliferation of internally displaced persons camps in 
Rakhine state (also known as Arakan) and sealed-off ghettos 
within urban areas may constitute genocide by isolation, 
starvation, and deprivation of the necessities of life if done with 
the intent to destroy the group.  Historically, not all genocides 
have been committed solely through mass killing, and if the 
Rohingya continue to be systematically purged from towns, 
villages, and cities throughout Rakhine and Burma in general, 
and if the IDP camps continue to be deprived of aid, the intent 
of genocide will appear more certain.212 
 
While this statement establishes the relevance of the issues of ghettoization 
and apartheid to Rohingya genocide, the Sentinel Project does not take into 
account that this process has been on-going since 1978.  Following 
Operation Nagamin, international journalists213 who covered Myanmar’s 
systematic persecution of the Rohingya began to use the word apartheid for 
those Rohingya who survived the first wave of expulsion. 214  Thirty years 
later, South Africa’s icon of anti-apartheid, Rev. Desmond Tutu described 
the Rohingya’s conditions as apartheid while in Rangoon. 215   The 
increasingly permanent nature of this segregation, or apartheid, has 
become a major concern for the UN. 216  This concern was officially 
reported by the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights Situation in 
Myanmar in his report to the UN Secretary General (and to the General 
Assembly) in September 2013.217    
                                                      
210  Id.  
211  Conversations between the authors and international humanitarian staff based in Myanmar 
(names and organizations withheld).   
212  Burma Risk Assessment, THE SENTINEL PROJECT FOR GENOCIDE PREVENTION (Sept. 2013), 
http://thesentinelproject.org/wp-content/uploads/Risk-Assessment-Burma-September-2013.pdf. 
213  Mattern, supra note 123, at 31. 
214  Id.  
215  Tutu Says Burma Must Avoid ‘New Apartheid’, THE IRRAWADDY (Feb 27, 2013), 
http://www.irrawaddy.org/human-rights/tutu-says-burma-must-avoid-new-apartheid.html. 
216  Special Rapporteur, Situation of human rights in Myanmar, U.N. Doc. A/68/397 (Sept. 23, 
2013) (by Tomás Ojea Quintana). 
217  Id.  
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6. Post-2012 Pogroms:  Flight from Myanmar by Sea Results in 
Violence and Death to Rohingya 
 
The situation in Rakhine State has led not only to internal 
displacement, but also to a new exodus of Rohingya.  Bangladesh 
responded by sealing their borders and limiting access to aid the Rohingya 
refugees.218  In the years prior to 2007, the Rohingya mainly left Rakhine 
and Bangladesh for Southeast Asia during the “sailing season” when the 
seas were safer. 219   Increased desperation, larger vessels, and the 
facilitation of departures by security forces in Myanmar, which enable 
people to leave in broad daylight, have seen greater and greater numbers 
leaving.220  Since June 2012, the reasons commonly given for departure are 
fears of continued violence, loss of livelihoods through targeted anti-
Rohingya and anti-Muslim boycotts, loss of properties, threat of violence, 
arbitrary arrest, and extortion.221   
Between June 2012 and May 2013, approximately 34,000 to 35,000 
Rohingya are believed to have taken to the sea—increasing from 
approximately 9,000 in 2011.222  The numbers are expected to grow further 
when the next sailing season begins.223  In the past, the vast majority of 
“boat people” were male.224   Now whole families, including women, 
children and the elderly, are leaving.225  In most cases, their lack of 
citizenship makes returning nearly impossible, changing temporary 
displacement into permanent displacement.  During anti-Rohingya 
immigration campaigns (for instance, the King Dragon Operation in 1978), 
Myanmar authorities struck whole Rohingya families off the official 
                                                      
218 The Human Rights of Stateless Rohingya in Bangladesh, EQUAL RIGHTS TRUST, (Oct. 9, 2012), 
http://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/ERT-UPR_Bangaldesh_2012.pdf (last visited May 24, 
2014). 
219   Interviews with a group of Rohingya and Karmin Muslim boat refugees, in Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia (Dec. 2012). [hereinafter Interviews with Researchers on Boat departures and arrivals]. 
220  To get a sense of the flows of Rohingya boat landings and routes, see Rohingya Asylum Seekers: 
Flows and Boat Landings in 2013, HUMANITARIAN INFO. UNIT, U.S. STATE DEP’T, 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Rohingya%20Asylum%20Seekers%20Flows%20%
26%20Boat%20Landings%20in%202013%20as%20of%2011%20Mar%202013.pdf (last visited May 24, 
2014). 
221  Interviews with researchers on boat departures and arrivals, supra note 219. 
222 The Rohingya Exodus from Myanmar, REUTERS, July 17, 2013, [hereinafter The Rohingya 
Exodus], http://www.trust.org/spotlight/the-Rohingya-exodus-from-myanmar/?tab=infographic. 
223  Interviews with Researchers on Boat departures and Arrivals, supra  note 219. 
224  Id.  
225  Interviews with Rohingya leaders including, interview with Abdul Hamid Bin Musa Ali, supra 
note 37. 
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registry of households, instantly making Rohingya illegals.226  Without 
legal residency by birth in the country, the Rohingya risk imprisonment or 
face threats of arrest and imprisonment.  Their illegality in turn makes 
them extremely vulnerable to extortion and abuse at the hands of the 
security forces. 227   Also, from a State perspective, formal bilateral 
deportation arrangements are impossible, as Myanmar does not recognize 
the Rohingya as their nationals, as indicated by their statelessness.228 
When the Rohingya are pushed from their land in Rakhine State and 
out of the country, they are often pushed into life-threatening situations, 
whereby destruction of the Rohingya people occurs even as they flee.  
Over the past year, the number of news reports about the sinking of boats 
carrying the fleeing Rohingya in the Andaman Sea off the Burmese 
coastline has risen, indicating that the outward journey across high seas 
and the country’s territorial water is fraught with fatal dangers.229  As 
recently as November 2013, only eight out of an estimated seventy to 
eighty Rohingya fleeing toward the neighboring Bangladesh survived 
when their boat fell apart several hours after it set sail.230  According to the 
UN, “[a]t least 500 people were believed to have died on boats in 2012 
alone.”231   
Those people who have survived the journeys recount unsafe and 
over-crowded conditions on the boats, deaths on board, running out of 
petrol and/or food, losing their way, and violence.232  In some cases, 
officials knowingly push Rohingya into life threatening situations.  For 
example, one Rohingya newly arrived in Malaysia described his 
experiences encountering a Burmese navy vessel during a journey that later 
resulted in the death of twelve Rohingya passengers from dehydration. 233  
                                                      
226 Interviews with U Ba Sein, a well-known London-based Rohingya blogger, who lived through 
and took pictures of the first wave of official anti-Rohingya campaign in Maung Daw, Rakhine State, 
Myanmar in Feb. 1978, London (April 2014).  
227  Interviews with Rohingya in Bangladesh and Malaysia (2010, 2012, and 2013). 
228  For a discussion of how states themselves produce the idea and reality of statelessness, watch 
the televised London School of Economics, particularly Maung Zarni’s intervention on the Rohingya 
statelessness. Democratic Voice of Burma, London School of Economics, YOUTUBE (June 19, 2012), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5myaBEV9Wk&feature=player_embedded. 
229  Courtney Subramanian, Boat Carrying Muslim Rohingya Sinks off Burma Coast: Minority 
group likely fleeing persecution, TIME (Nov. 3, 2013), http://world.time.com/2013/11/03/boat-carrying-
muslim-rohingya-sinks-off-myanmar-coast/. For the most recent coverage, see EDITORIAL, How 
Thailand is contributing to the misery of Burma’s persecuted Rohingya, WASH. POST (May 16, 2014),  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-thailand-is-contributing-to-the-misery-of-burmas-
persecuted-rohingya/2014/05/15/c4c5dd16-dad0-11e3-8009-71de85b9c527_story.html. 
230   Subramanian, supra note 229. 
231  The Rohingya Exodus, supra, note 222.  
232  Interviews with the then newly arrived Rohingya boat people, in Kuala Lumpur (Dec. 2012). 
233  Id. 
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After running out of petrol, food, and water, they were sighted by a navy 
patrol: 
 
They yelled at us and they scolded us.  They told us to come 
aboard the navy boat two or three at a time.  They told us to 
lie down flat on our stomachs with our face to the floor.  They 
beat each of us as we lay down.  We all got five lashes.  Some 
among us could speak Burmese fluently.  But those who spoke 
Burmese got extra lashes. They shouted, ‘Why do you speak 
Burmese? You are not Burmese.’ Then we were told to get 
back on our own boat. They gave us no food.  No water and 
no fuel.  The navy boat towed our boat for 10 hours into the 
open sea.  They confiscated our anchor.  When they untied our 
boat, they told us Thailand is in that direction. 234 
 
This experience demonstrates that even as Rohingya refugees flee, they are 
being pushed into situations that security forces knowingly understand may 
result in death or serious harm. 
The growing body of evidence on killing and violence against 
Rohingya populations in Rakhine State suggests that the intent is not 
simply to remove the Rohingya from land in Rakhine State, but also to 
destroy the Rohingya people through killing members of the group, 
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, and 
deliberately inflicting on the group conditions to bring about its physical 
destruction.  Further, illegalization of the Rohingya through a combination 
of forced eviction from Myanmar, deliberately enacted legal frameworks 
that relate only to the Rohingya, and state discourse designed to destroy 
their ethnic-religious identity, serves to facilitate state-sponsored and 
locally-perpetrated destruction and violence against them.  In a series of 
Burmese language interviews that were published in November 2013, ex-
General Khin Nyunt, who served as the head of the powerful Directorate of 
Defense Services Intelligence (DDSA) from 1988 till 2004, admitted that 
the country’s leadership has organized networks of non-state actors to “do 
dirty jobs” such as launching a violent mob ambush against the opposition 
leader Aung San Suu Kyi and her motorcade in 2003.235  These networks 
are not part of any formal state security forces.236  In the case of the violent 
attacks against the Rohingya, a typical pattern of attacks involves 
                                                      
234  Id. 
235  See Interviews with ex-General Khin Nyunt, supra note 169. 
236  Id.   
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coordination between the government security troops and local extremists 
among local Rakhines’s violent attacks against a given Rohingya 
community.237   
B. Imposed Marriage and Birth Restrictions are Discriminatory 
Population Control Measures Intended to Prevent Rohingya Births 
The state in Myanmar has not only denied Rohingya both their 
group identity and their birth right to citizenship, but also singled them out 
for policies and measures expressly designed to control birth and restrict 
marriages, solely on the basis of their ethnicity.  Through various decrees 
and orders, Myanmar government has made attempts to control the 
Rohingya population in the townships of North Rakhine State through 
severe restrictions on Rohingya marriages, births, and movement. In his 
Wall Street Journal opinion editorial, Matthew Smith, a well-known human 
rights researcher wrote: 
 
 “[M]y organization, Fortify Rights, recently published leaked 
government documents revealing abusive population control 
measures against Rohingya Muslims.  This and other evidence 
demonstrates that state and central government authorities are 
responsible for denying Rohingya fundamental human rights 
by limiting their freedom of movement, marriage and 
childbirth, among other aspects of daily life, in northern 
Rakhine State.238   
 
According to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
which entered into force on July 1, 2002, forced population control through 
the prevention of births of new group members is unequivocally a 
genocidal act.239  The policies to prevent births are implemented within the 
                                                      
237  Phone interviews with Zarganar, the country’s most famous political comedian and a member of 
the 27-member Rakhine Violence Inquiry Commission (Sep.-Dec. 2012).  
238 Matthew Smith, Burma's Ethnic Persecution is State Policy, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 13, 2014), 
http://www.fortifyrights.org/commentary-20140313.html.  We, the two co-authors examined some of the 
same leaked documents and concluded that the evidence of Myanmar’s genocidal intent too strong not to 
make the case for genocide.  However, Smith chose not to argue genocide not because the intent could 
not be established, but “because as a start-up human rights NGO Fortify Rights would not be able to 
survive the repercussions” of making a strong case for Rohingya genocide.  Personal communications 
with Matthew Smith, London (Apr 19, 2014).  
239  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Jul. 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.C 3, available at  
http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf.  
Article 6, Part II. Jurisdictions, Admissibility and Applicability reads thus:  
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context of a system of security grids that have arisen around the 
geographical pockets that contain and segregate the Rohingya from the rest 
of the population.  Over the years, the Rohingya have been pushed into 
pockets of Rohingya majority areas in North Rakhine State where their 
movement is severely restricted and their daily activities controlled by a 
large presence of security forces that control the Rohingya population 
through the implementation and threat of implementation of policies that 
apply to the Rohingya as non-nationals in specific geographical areas.240  
These policies include immigration laws that are applied to those who 
move or spend time outside of their households and villages and policies 
that directly aim to prevent Rohingya births.241  The marriage and birth 
restrictions within this context of tight population control fits the fourth 
delineating act of genocide, “imposing measures intended to prevent births 
within the group.”242 
Since 1994, local orders applying only to the Rohingya in North 
Rakhine State have required people to apply for official permission from 
the local authorities to marry.243  Permission is generally only granted on 
the payment of large bribes, and getting permission can take several 
years.244  Within the security grids, the Rohingya are subject to high levels 
of surveillance, forced labor, extortion and abuse, which together with 
discriminatory laws, control the daily lives of the population.245  This 
system of security grids includes regular and unannounced house calls by 
                                                                                                                                                             
For the purpose of this Statute, “genocide” means any of the following acts committed 
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, 
as such:  
(a) Killing members of the group;  
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;  
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part;  
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;  
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
 
Id.  
240  Numerous interviews with the Rohingya refugees, expatriates and activists in the United 
Kingdom, Germany, Malaysia, Thailand and the United States (2010-2013).  
241  Id. 
242  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 12.  
243  IRISH CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 150, at 125-26.  
244  The typical sum for a bribe securing official marriage license is between $500-$1,000, a year’s 
worth of earnings even for the urban Buddhist poor who can freely move about and make a living.  
Wakkar Uddin, Myanmar Muslim Association of the USA, GENOCIDE PREVENTION CONVENTION, Los 
Angeles, California (Jun. 4, 2012) (on file with the author).  Professor of Plant Sciences at Penn State 
University, Dr Uddin is General Secretary of the Arakan Rohingya Union, an official political NGO 
recognized as representative of Rohingya by the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC).     
245 This is a key finding of the report by the Irish Centre for Human Rights.  See IRISH CENTRE FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 150.  
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security forces and/or military civilian teams to check the household list 
against the people staying in the house at any given time.246  This system of 
security grids enables the State to tightly control the Rohingya population 
by the enforcement, threat of enforcement, and extortion via existing 
policies relating to the marriage, birth, and movement restrictions on the 
Rohingya.  Prison sentences of four to five years have been imposed on 
Rohingya men who cohabitate or have sexual relations outside marriage.247  
The widespread practice of population control through the security grids 
and severe restrictions relating marriage, births, and movement has led 
countless couples to flee to Bangladesh to avoid extortion and abuse.248 
Security forces also ensure that Rohingya who have fled North 
Rakhine State are struck off the household list, which is essentially an 
official government list of family members in a household, thus rendering 
them unable to return legally to their homes and neighborhoods. 249  
Families that have people additional to their household list staying in their 
homes, including additional children or marriage partners, are subject to 
arrest for unauthorized marriage, extortion, and abuse.250  If anyone on the 
household list is missing from the household, they may be struck off the 
list if large bribes are not paid, making it impossible for that household 
member to return to his/her home because of the risk of arrest as an illegal 
migrant and other charges or further extortion and abuse.251  
Couples have to sign forms when they obtain marriage permission 
stating they will not have more than two children.252  From 2005 onwards, 
as part of the strict requirements for obtaining permission to marry, 
Rohingya in Maungdaw and Buthidaung have been required to sign a 
declaration limiting the number of children they will have.253  This number 
                                                      
246 Interviews with the Rohingyas in Rangoon, Myanmar, London, UK, and Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia (2012-2013).  
247 The Arakan Project, Issues To Be Raised Concerning the Situation Of Stateless Rohingya 
Children In Myanmar (Burma), Submission to the Committee on The Rights Of The Child, For the 
Examination of the combined 3rd and 4th periodic State Party Reports, CRC/C/MMR/3-4 Jan. 2012 
(Myanmar),  available at http://www.burma library.org/docs12/AP-CRCMyanmar-12-01.pdf. 
248 Interviews with Rohingya refugees and immigrants, London, UK, Los Angeles, U.S., Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia, Bangkok, Thailand (2010-2013). 
249 Interviews with the Rohingya businessmen from Rangoon and Sittwe (or Akyab), Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia (Dec. 2013).  
250 Interviews with Rohingya refugees and immigrants, London, UK, Los Angeles, U.S., Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia, Bangkok, Thailand (2010-2013).  
251 Id.  
252 Interviews with Rohingya refugees, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (2012-2013).  See also, Szep & 
Marshall, supra note 9. 
253 Myanmar Border Affairs and Control Headquarters (or NaSaKa), Detailed Procedures for 
Bengali Population Control,  Regional Directive #1/2005, Kyi kan Pyin Nasaka Station, Maung 
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was three in 2005, and was reduced to two in 2007.254  The birth of an 
additional child means that the mother can be prosecuted under Section 
188 of the Penal Code for disobeying orders from a civil servant, which 
carries a prison sentence of up to six months. 255   In addition, the 
restrictions relating to marriages and births have resulted in high numbers 
of maternal deaths due to fear of accessing limited available health care, 
and illegal abortions performed without health professionals.256 Coupled 
with Myanmar’s policy of not allowing international organizations to train 
Rohingya women as midwives and nurses,257 restrictions of movement 
compound these maternal health problems since in emergencies women are 
often unable to obtain permission to access hospitals and life-saving 
services.258  
Additional children often remain unregistered—contributing to the 
estimated 60,000 unregistered Rohingya children259—and are not recorded 
on the family lists. Thus, these additional children open the door to 
increased extortion of the family. 260  Furthermore, unregistered children 
cannot apply for identification documents and are not eligible to attend 
school, apply for travel or marriage, or access other rights.261  
The policies relating to the Rohingya make explicit the State’s 
intention to control the birth rate of the Rohingya, establishing the 
Myanmar State’s intent to destroy the Rohingya.  On January 31, 1993, the 
NaSaKa issued a two-page directive, to the local Rakhine civil 
administration to strictly enforce the state’s policy to restrict the growth of 
the Rohingya population.262  The directive claims the population growth 
among the predominantly Rohingya in the region poses a future threat to 
peace and public order.263  The directive described the newborns in this 
region as members of a class of future criminals.264  Again in 2005, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
DawTownship, Nov. 2, 2008  (on file with the authors) [hereinafter Detailed Procedures for Bengali 
Population Control]. 
254 Chris Lewa, Two-child policy in Myanmar will increase bloodshed, CNN (Jun. 6, 2013). 
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/06/opinion/myanmar-two-child-policy-opinion/. 
255  Id.  
256  The Arakan Project, supra note 247.  
257  Since the first wave of anti-Rohingya ‘immigration’ campaign in 1978, the Rohingya have not 
been allowed to train or work as teachers, medical workers, etc.  Interviews with the older generation of 
Rohingya professionals in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, Bangkok, Thailand, New York, U.S., and London, 
UK (2010-2013).  See also, Associated Press in Yangon, supra note 136.  
258  Lewa, supra note 254. 
259  THE GOV’T OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR, supra note 130, at 67.  
260  Lewa, supra note 254. 
261  Id.  
262  See Detailed Procedures for Bengali Population Control, supra note 253. 
263  Id.     
264  Id.  
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same Nasaka Regional Headquarters based in Maungdaw township issued 
a set of detailed orders265 under the official title “Detailed Procedures for 
Bengali Population Control,” to the local administrative units listing 
specific measures designed to control the rate of population grown.266  
These orders criminalized parents who did not have prior marriage license 
for the birth of newborns and co-habitation outside of marriage, punishing 
men with more than one wife with up to seven years’ imprisonment, and 
involuntary birth control measures.267   
There has been a rise in popular support for population control 
following the report from the government-appointed Commission of 
Inquiry on the Rakhine State violence in 2012.268  This popular support is 
evidenced by wide-spread support in the domestic and social media269 as 
well as in political speeches; for example, a Burmese language Voice of 
America interview went viral in May 2013 with one of the members of the 
Rakhine Commission of Inquiry, Dr. Yin Yin Nwe, in which she called for 
birth control measures targeting only Rohingya populations.270  
The restrictions on marriage and births of Rohingya children in 
North Rakhine State since the early 1990s in the security grid of the three 
townships of North Rakhine State fall very clearly within the act of 
genocide “imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.”  
The intent to destroy the Rohingya people through these draconian 
measures is spelled out in the directives issued by the NaSaKa that state:  
“population control needs to be adopted in order to restrict the growth of 
these Bengali.  Other additional necessary restrictions and limits ought to 
be adopted as pre-emptive means of population control.”271  The report 
portrayed the Rohingya population as a future threat to national security 
                                                      
265  Id.     
266  Id.  
267  Id.  
268  THE GOV’T OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR, supra note 130.  The original 
Burmese version was released on Apr. 29, 2013 and the English version was released in August 2013.   
(Both versions on file with the authors). 
269  Thomas Fuller, Internet Unshackled, Burmese Aim Venom at Ethnic Minority, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 
15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/16/world/asia/new-freedom-in-myanmar-lets-burmese-air-
venom-toward-rohingya-muslim-group.html?_r=0. 
270  Voice of America Burmese Service, Interview with Dr. Yin Yin Nwe, YOUTUBE (May 13, 2013) 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d6tIdlb1YmI (last visited May 24, 2014). Dr. Yin Yin Nwe is a 
Cambridge-trained geologist, ex-daughter-in-law of the late General Ne Win, former head of UNICEF in 
China, and a member of the Presidential Inquiry Commission on the Sectarian Violence in Rakgine State, 
Myanmar.   
271  Report of the sentiments of the Rakhine Tai-Yin-Tha (Children of the soil, indigenous people) in 
Maungdaw district, RAKHINE NATIONAL DEFENCE AND PROTECTION ORGANIZATION, (Oct. 9, 1988) (On 
file with the authors).  This is a 30-page Burmese language report sent to the then Head of State Senior 
General Saw Maung.   
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and even characterized Rohingya children as a future criminal class.272  
The discriminatory manner in which these policies have only been applied 
to the Rohingya and the inaccurate state discourse that claims a Bengali 
population explosion,273 demonstrate intent to destroy the Rohinya people. 
These policies have also served to cause serious bodily and mental harm to 
the Rohingya people.  
 
C.   Deliberate Destruction of the Social Foundations of the Rohingya as 
an Ethno-Religious Group Inflicts on the Rohinya Conditions of Life 
Calculated to Bring About the Group’s Physical Destruction 
Over the past three decades, the social foundations of the Rohingya 
people as a group have been eroded with each wave of repression.   
Economic dispossession, physical displacement, restriction of movements, 
the targeted persecution of intellectuals and professionals with ties to the 
community at large who wield communal influence, among other tactics, 
are part and parcel of the State’s attempt to destroy the social anchor or 
foundation of the Rohingya community.  This attempt is part and parcel of 
the destruction, physical and otherwise, of the Rohingya. 
Like all other ethnic communities, the Rohingya community has 
been stratified along economic, class, and political lines.274  Gradually, the 
existing class of educated Rohingya, which during the country’s early 
independence period (1948-1958) included parliamentary secretaries, 
cabinet ministers, members of the parliament, well-to-do merchants, 
scholars, writers, artists, broadcasters, journalists and so on, vanished, 
while the new generation of Rohingya were denied citizenship and any 
opportunities to study medicine, engineering, and other tertiary/university 
level subjects considered professional subjects as opposed to arts or pure 
sciences.275  Recently, Rohingya community leaders or educated persons 
have been systematically targeted for arrest and prosecution.  The most 
high profile arrests since the violence of 2012 are medical doctor Tun 
Aung, age sixty-five, and retired lawyer Kyaw Hla Maung  age seventy-
six, who remain in Sittwe prison under falsified charges.276   Despite 
                                                      
272  Id.  
273  Voice of America Burmese Service, supra note 270. 
274  Interviews with a group of Rohingya businessmen and professionals, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 
and London, UK (2011-13).  
275  Interviews with a group of educated Rohingya residents and students, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 
(Apr.-Aug., 2013). 
276  See Urgent Action Network, Dr Tun Aung; jailed by the Burmese authorities for trying to help, 
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL UK/BLOGS (Jun. 6, 2013, 5:18 PM), http://www2. 
amnesty.org.uk/blogs/urgent-action-network/dr-tun-aung-jailed-burmese-authorities-trying-help; see also 
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international campaigning by Amnesty International and repeated requests 
by the U.N. and international governments for their release, they remain 
behind bars while Myanmar makes a show of releasing other political 
prisoners in other parts of the country.277   
Additionally, several thousand Rohingya men are also held behind 
bars across Arakan State, most arbitrarily arrested in the wake of the 
violence of 2012.278  One interviewee from Buthidaung, North Rakhine 
State said about the events that followed the June 2012 violence: 
  
In my village twenty-five men were arrested. It was about two 
weeks after the start of the violence. They were taken away. 
We don’t know where they are.  The military or the 
paramilitary took them. That time it was not the police [that 
arrested them].  Those people were either youths or they were 
our educated people.  Eight of us decided to leave after that.  
We felt afraid. 279 
 
Another interviewee from Maungdaw explained: 
 
After the clashes, the NaSaKa would come all the time to our 
village tract looking for boys and young men. They would 
look for any male who was over eleven years old.  They 
would come in the middle of the night, and we would have to 
run away.  Sometimes they would arrest the boys and men and 
take them away.  No one knows where they took them, or how 
many are alive or dead.  More than thirty people are gone 
from my area. We all feel that they have probably been killed.  
Before the clashes the NaSaKa would come to our houses 
sometimes and then they would always ask, “who has gone to 
another country,” and they would harass the family that way if 
someone is gone.  But since the clashes, it is different.  They 
                                                                                                                                                             
Sushetha Gopallawa, Myanmar: Release human rights activist Kyaw Hla Aung, REFUGEES 
INTERNATIONAL BLOG, (August 12, 2013), http://refugeesinternational.org/blog/myanmar-release-
rohingya-human-rights-activist (last visited May 24, 2014). 
277  Myanmar: Arrests continue amid promise to release all prisoners of conscience, AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL, (July 17 2013), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/myanmar-arrests-continue-amid-
promise-release-all-prisoners-conscience-2013-07-17 (last visited May 8, 2013). 
278  Interviews by author for Equal Rights Trust with Rohingya boat refugees, Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia (Dec. 2012).  See also Lawi Weng and Paul Vriez, More than 70 Rohingyas handed lengthy 
prison sentences, THE IRRAWADDY (Aug. 30 2013), http://www.irrawaddy.org/z_arakan/more-than-70-
rohingyas-handed-lengthy-prison-sentences.html.  
279  Interview conducted by author for Equal Rights Trust, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (Dec. 2012). 
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come and look for the young males and they arrest them and 
take them away.  Even my two young cousins were arrested. 
They are aged around eleven and twelve years old.  The 
NaSaKa come to their home at eleven PM at night and took 
them away.  We do not know where they are. 280 
 
By contrast, few Rakhine Buddhists, if any, have been imprisoned.281  
The impact on Rohingya families of having a male member behind 
bars is an important factor in the erosion of Rohingya social fabric.  North 
Rakhine State is home to a large number of female-headed households that 
often struggle to meet the household’s economic needs.282 They remain 
subject to arbitrary taxations and the extraction of forced labor, including 
from boys and old males.283  Women in female-headed households also 
become vulnerable to further abuse, including widespread sexual 
violence.284  
More than three decades of systematic repression has all but 
destroyed the Rohingya community, spiritually, educationally, 
economically, and has been detrimental to their health and well-being. 285  
The UN has identified a total of three pockets of food poor—near famine 
situations—in Burma and Rakhine State is one of them.286  Of the fourteen 
states and divisions that make up Myanmar’s administrative totality, 
Arakan or Rakhine state is the thirteenth poorest.287  In a country where 
even fully fledged citizens suffer from widespread poverty, lack of social 
safety nets, state protection, and welfare services, 288  the Rohingya—
                                                      
280  Interview by author for Equal Rights Trust, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (Dec. 2012). 
281  Out of a total of 1,835 arrested in connection with the mass violence in Rakhine, only 246 are 
Rakhine—and the rest are Rohingya.  GRUM, Rakhine Inquiry Report, REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF 
MYANMAR (Apr. 2013), http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Rakhine_Commission_Report-en-red.pdf 
(last visited May 24, 2014). 
282  For the Examination of the combined second and third periodic State Party Reports, see The 
Arakan Project, Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW),  CEDAW/C/MMR/3, (Oct. 2008) (Myanmar). 
283  IRISH CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 150, at 46-47.  
284  Id. at 61-73. 
285  Interviews with Kyaw Min, former (Rohingya) MP-elect, Rangoon via email (Sep.-Oct. 2013). 
286  The other two pockets are in eastern and southeastern border regions of Burma.  See, Myanmar:  
Overview, WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, http://www.wfp.org/countries/myanmar/overview (last visited Jan. 
7, 2013).  
287  THE GOV’T OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR, supra note 130, at 58.  
288 Myanmar Overview, WORLD BANK, (April 2013), http://www.worldbank.org/en/country 
/myanmar/overview (last visited Feb. 3, 2014); See also, The Crisis in Burma, THE INTERNATIONAL 
COALITION FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect. 
org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-burma (last visited Feb. 3, 2014); Myanmar Profile, BBC, (Jul. 16, 2013),   
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12990563.  
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stripped of their citizenship and subject to economic and social boycotts by 
the population at large—naturally became the most vulnerable.  
A cursory glance at the development statistics identifies the 
extremity of their hardships, in addition to, and as the direct result of, 
official discrimination, persecution, repression, labor exploitation, and 
violence at the hands of the state officials and organizations.  For instance, 
according to U.N. reports cited by the Rakhine Inquiry Commission, the 
doctor-patient ratio in the Rohingya areas, formerly May Yu District, are 1 
to 75,000 in Maungdaw and 1 to 83,000 in Buthidaung as compared with 
Myanmar’s national ratio of 1 to 375 and the state’s ratio in the capital city 
of Sittwe 1 to 681.289  The infant mortality rate of the Rohingya is almost 
twice Myanmar’s national average.290   For over thirty years, Rohingya 
students, as a matter of state educational policies which categorize them as 
‘foreigners,’ who are not permitted to study medicine, veterinary science, 
engineering, and other professional subjects.291  Meanwhile, hardly any 
Burmese doctors choose to work in deeply impoverished areas such as the 
Rohingya areas.292   
Additionally, the overwhelming majority of Rohingya who have 
been rendered stateless by the 1982 Citizenship Act293 are not allowed to 
work in the civil service and are thus reliant on teachers from outside of the 
Rohingya community.294  In the wake of the 2012 violence, many schools 
have not re-opened in Rohingya areas, as teachers no longer feel safe.295  
Three decades after the initial denial of their citizenship and ethnic identity, 
the once thriving Rohingya society that produced parliamentarians, 
technocrats, and successful business men, now has an eighty percent 
illiteracy rate among adults, with higher rates for women.296  More than 
sixty percent of children aged between five and seventeen have never been 
enrolled in school.297 
                                                      
289 Myanmar Overview, WORLD BANK, (April 2013) http://www.worldbank.org/en/country 
/myanmar/overview (last visited Feb. 3, 2014). 
290  Id. 
291  Interviews with a group of Rohingya professionals, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and London, UK 
(2012-2013).  
292 The Ongoing Humanitarian Emergency in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, supra note 197.  
293  According to the official government estimate, only 40,000 out of Myanmar’s 1.33 million 
Rohingya are recognized as citizens.  See Szep & Marshall, supra note 9.   
294  Telephone interview with Tun Khin, President, Burmese Rohingya Organization UK, London, 
UK (October 2013).  Tun Khin’s grandfather, a Rohingya, was a member of the parliament during the 
pre-military parliamentary government of PM U Nu in the 1950s.   
295  U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, supra note 193 at 21.  
296  The Arakan Project, supra note 247. 
297  The Arakan Project, supra note 247. 
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Through various informal and official practices, the state in 
Myanmar has effectively destroyed the social foundations of a Rohingya 
society, deprived the Rohingya people of capable community leaders, and 
excluded new generations of Rohingya from whatever is left of social, 
public, and educational services.  Over the past thirty years since the 1982 
Citizenship Act came into effect, the pattern of attempts to inflict physical 
destruction of the Rohingya strongly suggests that the Rohingya have been 
subject to a process of genocide designed to “inflict on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole 
or in part.”298  
D. Intent to Destroy the Rohingya Through Erasure of Their Identity 
and History 
Genocide requires that the delineated acts occur with an “intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group.”299  This section examines how the denial and erasure of the 
Rohingyas’ identity and history has been carried out as a matter of policy 
by the State in Burma over the past thirty years.  The denial of identity, or 
the “bengalization” of the Rohingya, is a sign of genocide in Myanmar as 
it sets the stage for the dehumanization of the group and strips them of 
group rights and protection, and their demonization.300  Section 1 describes 
the State’s initial plans to destroy the Rohingya while Section 2 discusses 
the importance of the Inquiry Commission on Violence, and Section 3 
describes the forced denial of Rohingya identity.  The processes by which 
this destruction has happened, alongside the erosion of Rohingyas’ 
citizenship rights, indicates the State’s intent to destroy the Rohingya as a 
people.  In addition, it is this erasure of identity and history that facilitates 
the mobilization of violence, hatred, and killing of the Rohingya.  
 
                                                      
298  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 12.  
299  Id.   
300  See The Hidden Genocide, AL JAZEERA, Dec. 9, 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes 
/aljazeerainvestigates/2012/12/2012125122215836351.html.   See also, Burma, SENTINEL PROJECT FOR 
GENOCIDE PREVENTION (2013), http://thesentinelproject.org/situations-of-concern-2/burma-soc/ (last 
visited May 20, 2014).  
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1. The State Officially Erases Rohingya Identity Beginning in 1962 and 
Continuing to the Present Day, Demonstrating Its Intent to Destroy 
the Rohingya and Complicity in their Destruction  
 
The reversal in recognizing the Rohingya as an ethnic group in 
official discourse between the early independence years and the 1982 
Citizenship Act came about as a direct result of the proactive push from the 
ultra-nationalist Rakhine intellectuals in Ne Win’s government.   Members 
of the drafting committee for the 1982 Citizenship Law used the notion of 
fixed and externally defined ethnic categories to map out a list that, 
drawing on colonial records, retrospectively fixed the races and ethnic 
groups of Myanmar in stone.301  The late Rakhine ultra-nationalist historian 
Dr. Aye Kyaw, a proactive member of the 1982 Citizenship Act drafting 
committee under the direct patronage of General Ne Win, made it clear that 
the Rakhine ultra-nationalists were determined to reclaim the Arakan for 
Buddhist Arakanese only, under the philosophical/ideological banner Tai-
yin-tha, or the “original indigenous peoples.”302  Furthermore, in contrast 
to the more loosely defined pre-colonial era “national races” in the 
citizenship laws of 1947, the committee fixed the ethnic groups that 
existed before 1824, ignoring the fact that the borderlands such as Northern 
Rakhine in those days were neither clearly demarcated nor effectively 
administered by any political power, feudal, or colonial nation. 303  
Capturing the essence of borderlands, the Bengali economist and 
philosopher Amartya Sen304 perceptively remarked, “Burma came to the 
Rohingya, not the other way around.”   
Burmese leadership continued to confirm the structure of the 1982 
Citizenship Act and deny the Rohingya as a distinct ethnic people through 
systematic and blatant erasure of group’s identity.  Successive military 
governments since General Ne Win’s Socialist Programme Party 
government staunchly maintain that the Rohingya as an ethnic people 
never existed.305  This denial continues today.  During a question and 
                                                      
301  See supra Part II.B. 
302  See Dr. Aye Kyaw, YOUTUBE (May 2, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hdyfe-kCvJU 
(last visited Sept. 25, 2013) (showing Rakhine ultra-nationalist historian Dr. Aye Kyaw espousing ‘pure’ 
Buddhist Rakhine nationalism). 
303  For a brief but superb overview of Burma’s censuses with a focus on the 1973 Census, see M. 
ISMAEL KHIN MAUNG, supra note 41.  This paper dissected the categorization of races and ethnic groups 
in Burma’s censuses.   
304  Amartya Sen, Columbia University, Roundtable: Burma in Transition: Minorities, Human 
Rights and Democratic Process, New York (Sept. 14, 2012).  One of the authors was a discussant at the 
roundtable.  
305  Inkey, supra note 3. 
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answer session at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham 
House) in London on July 15, 2013, President Thein Sein, when asked 
whether his government was ever going to restore full citizenship rights to 
the Rohingyas, denied the existence of the Rohingya in Burma:  “We do 
not have the term ‘Rohingya’ [in Myanmar].”306  The Myanmar President 
is not alone in his denial of the Rohingyas’ existence as a term or an ethnic 
group; this official position on the Rohingya extends throughout the State. 
In a Burmese language press briefing on the subject of Myanmar’s 2014 
Census held in Rangoon in September 2013, the Minister of Immigration 
and former police chief ex-Brigadier Khin Yi was emphatic that no ethnic 
and cultural group will be recognized as a distinct national ethnic group 
except the ‘135 national races’ who were officially recognized by the 1982 
Citizenship Act.307  
Further, this state view is both echoed and informed by prominent 
Rakhine and Myanmar academics, including those that are educated 
overseas.  In Aye Chan’s essay “Who are the Rohingyas?” which appeared 
in the ultra-nationalist publication Piccima Zone Magazine, the leading 
Rakhine scholar writes:  
 
It is obvious that the term ‘Rohingyas’ was created in 1950s 
by the educated Chittagonian descendants from Mayu Frontier 
area [present day Buthidaung and Maungdaw Districts] and 
that it cannot be found in any historical source materials in 
any language till then (emphasis added). The creators of that 
term might be of the second or third generations of the 
Bengali immigrants from… Bangladesh.308   
 
This erasure of history and the denial of identity in official discourses and 
historical accounts should be understood as part of the broader ethnic-
cleansing process of the Rohingya and others:  
 
...their [Rakhine historians’] criticism [of Rohingya history 
and identity] is not historical, logical and authentic, but only 
                                                      
306  Id.  See also, Comm’n on Human Rights, supra note 110, at ¶ 41.   
307  Myanmar Prepares for First Census in Three Decades, RADIO FREE ASIA (Sept. 19, 2013), 
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/census-09192013150846.html.   For a critical and historical 
view of censuses in Burma, see Soni Trivedi, Myanmar’s census a crucial democracy test, THE HINDU, 
(Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/myanmars-census-a-crucial-
democracy-test/article4138674.ece.  
308  Aye Chan, Who are the Rohingyas?, PICCIMA ZONE MAGAZINE, Feb. 2010, Vol.1, at 266 
(emphasis added). 
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chauvinistic in nature, racialist in tendency. These are 
blending of truth with false wishes and communal hatred 
intended to strip off Rohingya’s political and citizenship rights 
in Myanmar...These writers try to take the mask of Rakhine 
nationalists and invite all Buddhist people in Myanmar to join 
them in the ethnic cleansing of Rohingya people. 309 
 
In the case of the Rohingya, the past indeed belongs to those who control 
the present.   
The erasure of Rohingya from official histories in Myanmar has 
been achieved through the mobilizing of popular and inaccurate 
assumptions about ethnic identity formation.  In Myanmar society today, 
there is a general assumption that Rakhine Buddhist identity is one that has 
existed largely unchanged from before recorded history, 310  and that 
Myanmar and her ethnic groups have been in existence with only brief 
intervals of colonial interruption.311  The Rohingya identity, in contrast, is 
assumed to be entirely instrumental or politically motivated, devoid of any 
history in Myanmar, despite the fact that they have been and are the people 
of the borderlands.312  The emphasis on defining nationality on racial terms 
in Myanmar, including in the 1982 Citizenship Act, has led a large 
proportion of the non-Rohingya population to feel that shifting one’s 
identity between “Arakanese or Rakhine Muslim” and the more ethnically 
ascribed term “Rohingya,” both of which can be valid at any one given 
time, somehow reflects dishonesty or malicious intent. 313   This 
                                                      
309  Kyaw Min, Rohingya History: Reality, Devoid of Myth 1 (May 2012) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with the authors).  
310 See Maung Zarni, Confronting the Demons, THE IRRAWADDY (Oct. 17, 2009), 
http://www2.irrawaddy.org/opinion_story.php?art_id=17011.  
311 Id.  For a critical analysis of ideological developments in historical Burma, see Zar Ni 
Knowledge, Control and Power: The Politics of Education in Burma under Military Rule (1962-88) 
(1988) (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Wisconsin at Madison).  The notion of historical 
continuity and peaceful co-habitation of all indigenous races is one of the most popular myths widely 
shared among the Burmese public.    
312  The pioneering works of Leach and others such as Lehman and Scott, have changed the way 
ethnic identity formation in Myanmar and around the world is understood, by focusing on the fluidity of 
its nature, and deconstructing the ethnic categories that have been designated, often through inaccurate 
records from the colonial era. Specifically, see SCOTT, supra note 38; LEHMAN, supra note 38; LEACH, 
supra note 38.  The works on ethnicity by Scott and Lehman were built on Leach’s seminal work on 
ethnic identity as a result of fluid political choices made by members of a given ethnic group.  
313  Based on the authors’ examination of the Burmese language on-line and print media the popular 
discourses as reflected in the mass media, is littered with news stories and quotes that demonstrate this 
categorically negative perception of the word Rohingya.  Also, our findings have been corroborated by 
the  interviews with three religiously and ethnically diverse groups of Burmese trainees at the 
multiculturalist workshops organized and conducted by the Burmese co-author in the months of January 
and May, Bangkok, 2013, and again in Kuala Lumpur, Nov. 2013.  See Hate Speech of Burmese 
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understanding is reflected in the Rakhine Commission Report on the recent 
violence, which firmly laid the blame with the Rohingya: 
 
[S]hould the Bengalis continue to insist they should be called 
Rohingya, the majority in the country will not accept this and 
there could be further unrest.  The indigenous Rakhine can be 
expected to have an intense reaction.  Thus, Bengalis now 
pushing to use the term Rohingya are surely fanning the 
flames of sectarian violence.314 
 
While most of the international community recognizes the right of 
individuals to self-identify,315 Myanmar has denied this right through the 
way citizenship and belonging is defined.  
 
2. Denial of the Rohingya Identity By Inquiry Commission on Violence 
in Rakhine State Indicates Intent to Destroy the Rohingya and 
Complicity in their Destruction  
 
Myanmar’s presidentially appointed Inquiry Commission on the 
Violence in Rakhine State has also played a crucial role in the State’s 
continuing attempts to erase the Rohingya history and identity.316  On 
President Thein Sein’s orders, the commission was formed in August 2012 
to investigate the causes of the violence in Rakhine State.317  It also served 
to distract from the growing calls for an independent international 
inquiry.318   
In the hands of the commission's social scientists,319 the Rohingya 
were called Bengali throughout the report, additionally othering them by 
                                                                                                                                                             
Buddhist Monk against Myanmar Muslim, YOUTUBE (Mar. 26, 2013).  http://www.youtube. 
com/watch?v=vDl9MvpRiSE.   See also, Steven Kiersons, The Colonial Origins of Hate Speech in 
Burma, THE SENTINEL PROJECT (Oct. 28, 2013), http://thesentinelproject.org/the-colonial-origins-of-
hate-speech-in-burma/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2014).   
314 THE GOV’T OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR, supra note 130, at 56.  
315  Who are the Indigenous Peoples?, INTERNATIONAL WORK GROUP FOR INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, 
http://www.iwgia.org/culture-and-identity/identification-of-indigenous-peoples (last visited Dec. 5, 2013).  
316 For the first thorough critique of the Inquiry Commission’s misconduct during the inquiry 
process and the substance of its original Burmese language report, see Maung Zarni, Myanmar 
Whitewashes Ethnic Cleansing, ASIA TIMES, May 1, 2013, http://www.atimes.com/atimes 
/Southeast_Asia/SEA-03-010513.html.  
317  Myanmar Sets Up Internal Probe of Sectarian Unrest, THE IRRAWADDY, Aug. 18, 2012, 
http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/burma-sets-up-internal-probe-of-sectarian-unrest.html. 
318  Id. 
319  Out of its original twenty-seven members, at least one third of them are Western educated 
Burmese including social scientists who received their advanced trainings, including PhDs, at Cornell, 
Cambridge and Harvard.  In fact, Drs. Myo Myint and Kyaw Yin Hlaing, the presidential inquiry 
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dichotomising them against the Tai-Yin-Tha or so-called indigenous 
groups.320  Since the first meeting, the Rakhine commissioners objected to 
the use of the word Rohingya in the discussion.321  At the same time, some 
of the Burmese human rights advocates threatened to walk out of meetings 
if anyone evoked the principle of universal human rights in relation to the 
Rohingya. 322  Rohingya presence in Rakhine State prior to Myanmar’s 
independence was ignored.  
In addition, the recognition of the Rohingya in official discourse and 
their citizenship rights in the 1950s and 1960s were skipped in the report's 
historical section.323  This omission was not due to a lack of archival 
records or oral histories of both the Rohingya and state officials who lived 
through those crucial decades, especially since the Burmese language 
report stated clearly that the commissioners poured over relevant materials 
held in Myanmar’s national archives as well as in “big research 
universities” overseas.324  Instead, the commission highlighted the anti-
Rohingya Rakhine nationalist version of history, which denies that the 
Rohingya ever existed. 325   Further, the Commissioners chose not to 
problematize the well-documented role of the State in the violence against 
the Rohingya, which began with the brutal immigration campaign of 
1978.326  
While the President appointed half a dozen Rakhine ultra-
nationalists, the Commission was noted for its conspicuous absence of 
Rohingya representatives.327  Out of the six non-Rohingya Muslims drawn 
from the country’s five different national Islamic organizations, the two 
Commission members who questioned the integrity of the inquiry process 
                                                                                                                                                             
Commission’s Chair and Secretary respectively, earned their doctorates in political science and history 
under the supervision of Benedict O. G. Anderson at Cornell whose seminal work on nationalism and 
nation-states argues that national identities are nothing more than products of collective imaginations.  It 
is curious that these highly trained Burmese scholars have gone along with the State that stripped off the 
Rohingya’s group identity as a matter of policy.    
320  THE GOV’T OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR, supra note 130.   
321 Interview with U Nyunt Maung Shein & U Tin Maung Than, supra note 184.  Telephone 
interviews with Zaganar, a Buddhist commissioner on the same commission and the country’s most 
prominent political comedian, (Dec. 2012, Apr. 2013).  
322  Telephone and face-to-face interviews with two Muslim commissioners and one prominent 
Buddhist commissioner of the Myanmar Inquiry Commission on the Conflicts in Rakhine, in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia, Oslo, Norway, and Bangkok, Thailand (Nov. 2012- Apr. 2013).    
323  THE GOV’T OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR, supra note 130.   
324  Id.  
325  Id.  
326  Mattern, supra note 123, at 31. 
327  The best known among them was veterinarian Aye Kyaw who is a Rakhine Member of the 
Parliament in Naypyidaw.  He chairs the Rakhine Nationality Development Party and openly expresses 
his desire to copy Israel’s model of reclaiming “Rakhine land for pure Rakhine Buddhists.”      
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were dismissed by the president.328  One was detained for a short period for 
going public about what he called a “fraudulent investigation.”329  The 
commission’s official act of denying the Rohingya identity is all the more 
shocking considering the commission's ethnic diversity, including 
representatives from the ethnic Kachin, Chin, Karen, Shan, and other 
communities that have experienced oppression from state authorities.330   
The process of erasing the Rohingya identity and eroding their rights 
has not yet finished.  Within the next two years, the census of 2014331 and 
the national elections of 2015 are potential pressure points in the long 
struggle for the Rohingya to have their identity and their rights recognized 
in Myanmar.  It is notable, however, that in the views of some, the process 
of erasing the Rohingya ethnic identity has already been completed.  In 
May 2013, Rakhine State spokesman Win Myaing summed up this crucial 
and hitherto widely overlooked link between the erasure of Rohingya 
identity and the genocide: “How can it be ethnic cleansing?  They are not 
an ethnic group.”332 
 
3.   The State Causes Serious Bodily and Mental Harm to Rohingya by 
Forced Denial of their Ethnic Identity and Confirms Intent to 
Destroy 
 
Article 2 of the Convention on the Punishment and Prevention of the 
Crime of Genocide specifically includes “causing serious bodily or mental 
harm to members of the group.”333  Rohingya experience the attempts to 
destroy their identity in everyday forms as both physical and symbolic 
                                                      
328  Interview with U Nyunt Maung Shein & U Tin Maung Than, supra note 184.  U Nyunt Maung 
Shein and U Tin Maung Than were the two commissioners expelled from the Inquiry Commission.  
329  Interviews with both ex-Commissioners, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (April 2013).  The two 
Myanmar Muslim commissioners who were sacked from the Commission are U Nyunt Maung Shein and 
U Tin Maung Than.  Tin Maung Than was briefly detained by the Police Special Branch on the grounds 
that he broke the commission’s rules barring the members from talking to the press during the inquiry.  In 
contrast, the Buddhist commissioners who routinely made media comments on the status and 
proceedings of the inquiry were left untouched.  
330  Briefing: Myanmar’s ethnic problems, UN OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN 
AFFAIRS (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.irinnews.org/report/95195/briefing-myanmar-s-ethnic-problems.   
See also, Medha Chaturvedi, Myanmar’s Ethnic Divide: The Parallel Struggle, SPECIAL REPORT, 
INSTITUTE OF PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES (2013), http://www.ipcs.org/special-
report/myanmar/myanmars-ethnic-divide-the-parallel-struggle-131.html.  
331 Wary of Official Census, Burma’s Ethnic Minorities Count Their Own, THE IRRAWADDY, Dec. 4, 
2013, http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/wary-official-census-burmas-ethnic-minorities-count.html.  
332 Szep, supra note 3.  
333  U.N. Convention on the Punishment and Prevention of the Crime of Genocide, Art. 2. Dec. 9, 
1948. 
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violence that cause them physical and mental harm.334  Individually and as 
a group, Rohingya are routinely forced to identify as Bengali and are 
accused of being foreigners by the state, including when they face arbitrary 
arrest or encounter security forces.335  The Sentinel Project noted, 
 
Attempts to Bengalize the Rohingya have recurred several 
times with reports that victims are tortured and beaten until 
they sign papers indicating they are Bengali. In another 
incident, between 20 and 23 June 2013, 34 people were 
forcibly registered by the authorities in a village near the 
border town of Maung Daw.336   
 
Rohingya genocide involves the destruction of a culture and identity of a 
target group closely linked with the physical and mental harm and 
destruction of the group.  Additionally, the erasure and destruction of the 
group identity is designed to deal a blow to its collective psyche or mental 
well-being.  Preliminary research on the link between the state policy of 
identity destruction and the mental harm to the group indicates mental 
harm directly arises from the destruction and erasure of the group’s 
identity. 337  The official denial of the Rohingya’s existence and rights in 
Myanmar is part and parcel of the processes of the destruction of the 
Rohingya as a group.   
The Rohingya are forced to officially deny their identity in multiple 
contexts.  The Rohingya in the three townships of North Rakhine State—
Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung—in addition to unannounced 
house calls by security personnel,338 are subject to yearly verification 
processes whereby armed teams of security personnel and civilian 
authorities check the household members against the family list.339  As part 
of this regular on-going process, the Rohingya in North Rakhine State are 
                                                      
334  Interviews with Rohingya refugees and/or immigrants, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Thailand, UK, 
and U.S., (2010-2013).   
335  Id. 
336  Jérôme, Escalating anti-Rohingya Persecution, 2013, THE SENTINEL PROJECT, (Sep. 10, 2013) 
http://thesentinelproject.org/launch-of-a-new-visualization-of-the-escalating-persecution-of-the-
rohingya-muslim-minority-in-burma/. 
337 Interviews with Rohingya refugees and/or immigrants, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Thailand, UK, and 
U.S. (2010-2013).  See also,  personal communication with Arthur Kleinman, a noted medical 
anthropologist in the Department of Global Health and Social Medicine and professor of psychiatry at 
Harvard Medical School, Cambridge (Nov. 19, 2013).  
338  See infra, Part III.D.3. 
339  Interviews with a group of Rohingya businessmen who frequently travel from Rangoon to Kuala 
Lumpur, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (Sept.– Nov. 2013).  
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forced to register as Bengali.340  In 2013, this process of registration as 
Bengali was extended to the violence-hit areas elsewhere in Rakhine State, 
under two pretexts.  For the international audience, the pretext was to 
reissue documents that had been destroyed by the violence and destruction; 
for the local audience the pretext was to identify illegals, under the same 
justification as Operation Nagamin in 1978.341  The registration teams were 
met by groups, including women and children, protesting at being 
registered as Bengali. 342   Security forces dealt with the protesters 
harshly.343  Additionally, the government has made many failed attempts to 
register the IDPs in the camps that have become home to over 140,000 
people since June 2012.344  As Reuters noted: “For Fukan Ahmed and other 
Rohingya leaders, it (registration as Bengali) sent a chilling message: If 
they want to be resettled (back to their homes), they must deny their 
identity.”345   While the camps’ populations need to be registered for 
humanitarian and protection reasons, 346  this is also viewed by some 
Rohingya as part of the Bengalization process.347   
Rohingya refugees in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, consistently 
recounted incidents of violence suffered at the hands of Burmese 
authorities each time they identified themselves as Rohingya.348  Whether 
they were picked up on the street of a major Arakan city like Sittwe, or 
intercepted off the Burmese coast by the Burmese Navy, Rohingyas from 
different generations said the Burmese security officials typically ask them 
about their race or ethnic group.349  Use of the word Rohingya would 
trigger physical and racial abuse. 350   One Rohingya interviewee, for 
example, recounted his experience in the hands of the Burmese security 
officials in 1991 as a teenage student in Sittwe as part of Operation Shwe 
                                                      
340  Burma Risk Assessment, supra note 212. 
341  Confidential interviews with UN officials. 
342  Id.  
343  See Why Myanmar's Rohingya are forced to say they are Bengali, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR, June 2, 2013, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2013/0602/Why-Myanmar-s-
Rohingya-are-forced-to-say-they-are-Bengali/(page)/2.  
344  Anonymous interview with UNHCR staff. 
345  Szep, supra note 3. 
346  Myanmar: Minority Rights are non-negotiable, REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL (May 29, 2013), 
http://refugeesinternational.org/policy/field-report/myanmar-protecting-minority-rights-non-negotiable 
(last visited Oct. 23, 2013). 
347  Interviews with Rohingya rights advocates via email, Yangon, Burma, London, UK, and New 
York, U.S. (2013). 
348  Interviews with Rohingya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (2011-2013). 
349 Numerous interviews with the Rohingya refugees and legal residents in Kuala Lumpur, 
including fresh arrivals from Burma as well as the established Rohingya professionals, Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia (2011-2013). 
350  See Why Myanmar's Rohingya are forced to say they are Bengali, supra note 343.  
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Pyi Thar (or Operation Prosperous and Peaceful Nation). 351  Like many 
other Rohingya teenagers and adults, he was brought to a local police 
Special Branch station where he was put in a holding cell.352  The Special 
Branch agents asked him, ‘What is your name?,’ followed by ‘What is your 
ethnic group?’ 353  When he answered he was a Rohingya, they punched 
him in the face and head, while angrily shouting at him, “you mother-
fucker.  You aren’t Rohingya.  You are Bengali.  Say, I am Bengali.”354   
According to his account, he finally cried and said, “I don’t know what to 
say.  My parents told me we are Rohingya.  So, I told you I am Rohingya.  
But, please stop hurting and write down any name you want for my 
face.”355   
Another interviewee related his experience of being a Rohingya 
trying to travel to Yangon in 1993, 
 
I tried to leave my village once before in 1993. I tried to go to 
Yangon. But I was caught and sent to prison for more than 10 
years because I was trying to leave.  I was sentenced to 8 
years hard labor. They accused me of being from Bangladesh. 
When I told them that I was Rohingya, they forced me to 
write that I was Bengali.  After 8 years in Maungdaw, I was 
sent to Sittwe prison for 2 years. I was laboring with shackles 
around my ankles. Look at the scars they left there. My family 
could only visit me one time in one year when I was in prison 
because they had no income to make the trip. In Maungdaw, I 
was beaten more than 10 times per day. My whole body 
sustained intense pain. My back, my ribs, my arms, all over.  
They beat me anywhere for no reason. If I worked hard, they 
still beat me.356  
 
This account clearly shows not only how Rohingya are forced to register as 
Bengali, but also how the Rohingya as non-citizens have been criminalized 
simply for attempting to travel within the country and are subjected to 
violence.  
                                                      
351  Interview with the Rohingya resident Ko Shwe Maung, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (May 2013) 
(translated by author). 
352  Id.  
353  Id.  
354  Id.  
355  Id.  
356  Interview with 55 year old Rohingya man from Southern Rakhine, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 
(Dec. 2012). 
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The erasure of Rohingya history and identity in Myanmar is firstly 
an instrument of genocide because it lays the foundation on which 
destruction and abuse has occurred by invalidating their existence and their 
group identity.  The illegalization of the Rohingya’s existence and the 
destruction of their group identity have paved the way for widespread hate-
speech against the Rohingya, which accompanies the anti-Rohingya and 
anti-Muslim violence.357  It was the alarming rates of hate-speech in 
Myanmar together with the State’s failure to stop the spread of this hate-
speech that accompanied the pogroms of 2012.358  This progression led the 
U.N. Special Rapporteur to remark in March 2013,  
 
The Government must take immediate action to stop the 
violence from spreading to other parts of the country and 
undermining the reform process. This includes stemming 
campaigns of discrimination and hate speech which are 
fueling racist and, in particular, anti-Muslim feeling in the 
country.  And it involves holding to account those responsible 
for acts of violence and destruction against religious and 
ethnic minorities.359 
 
This hate-speech and denial of history and identity is part of the 
dehumanization and stigmatization of the Rohingya. For example, a 
popular book co-authored by prominent Rakhine historian Dr. Aye Chan 
that discusses the non-existence of the “so-called Rohingya”360 is titled 
“Influx virus: The Illegal Muslims of Arakan.”361  Equating the Rohingya 
to disease very clearly falls into the process of dehumanization that is 
described in Gregory Stanton’s “8-stages of genocide.”362  Stanton writes: 
 
[O]ne group denies the humanity of the other group.  Members 
of it are equated with animals, vermin, insects or diseases. 
                                                      
357  The holocaust museum recently drew attention to the issue of hate speech against the Rohingya. 
See Holocaust Museum Bears Witness to the Plight of the Rohingya, OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE (Nov 6 
2013), http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/holocaust-museum-bears-witness-plight-burmas-
rohingya. 
358  Sai Latt, A Jingoist Media Foments Violence in Burma’s Arakan state, ASIA SENTINEL, Oct. 30 
2013, http://www.asiasentinel.com/society/a-jingoist-media-foments-violence-in-burmas-arakan-state/. 
359  Press Release UNOHCHR, Religious violence in Myanmar, the consequences of Government 
inaction in tackling prejudice and discrimination (March 23, 2013), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/News 
Events/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13205&LangID=. 
360  AYE CHAN & U SHW ZAN, supra note 32, at 1.  
361  Id.  
362  George Stanton, The 8-stages of genocide, GENOCIDE WATCH (1998), http://www.genocide 
watch.org /aboutgenocide/8stagesofgenocide.html.  
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Dehumanization overcomes the normal human revulsion 
against murder.  At this stage, hate propaganda in print and on 
hate radios is used to vilify the victim group. 363 
 
This hate propaganda has clearly been seen in printed pamphlets 
distributed in Rakhine State and in the hate-speech on social media and 
Myanmar’s domestic media.  
The official and popular acts of erasure of the Rohingya ethnic 
identity clearly indicate the intent to destroy the very foundations upon 
which the Rohingya people as a group exist. These acts of erasure 
legitimize and encourage hate-speech and the dehumanization of the 
Rohingya, which is used to vilify the Rohingya victims and justify the 
violence against and destruction of the Rohingya.  Additionally, the erasure 
and denial of identity is experienced by the Rohingya as violence in 
multiple forms, including at the hands of state authorities when they are 
physically forced to register as “Bengali” and civilian populations in the 
targeted anti-Rohingya boycotts and campaigns of violence.  This violence 
results in serious bodily and mental harm to the Rohingya. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS AND IMPORTANCE OF NAMING THE ABUSES AGAINST 
THE ROHINGYA  “GENOCIDE” 
With the sole exception of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation 
(“OIC”),364 representing fifty-seven Muslim countries, the international 
community has shied away from calling the Rohingya abuses of the past 
thirty-five years genocide.365  There seems to be no appetite among the 
world’s major powers for ending the immense sufferings of the estimated 
1.3 million Rohingya of Western Burma.  As an ethnic group, the 
Rohingya have been subjected to Myanmar’s intentional policies and 
practices designed to inflict conditions of life so unbearable that thousands 
have preferred to risk life at high seas or face unseen risks at the hands of 
human traffickers than remain in semi-concentration camps and inhuman 
                                                      
363  Id. 
364  Stop Rohingya Genocide: OIC, ONISLAM, Nov. 17, 2012, http://www.onislam.net/english/news/ 
asia-pacific/460041-stop-rohingya-genocide-oic.html.  
365  Even the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum and the New York-based Human Rights Watch, the 
two leading organizations that are most sympathetic to the plight of the Rohingya and advocating for the 
restoration of citizenship status to the 1.3 million Rohingya in Myanmar have fallen short of calling the 
still un-folding process of Rohingya genocide a genocide, opting to call it ethnic cleansing.  See, e.g., 
Burma, UNITED STATES HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, http://www.ushmm.org/confront-
genocide/cases/burma (last visited Jan. 10, 2014). Western officials, on the other hand, strongly oppose 
the use of the term genocide in discussing the Rohingya issue.  Interviews with several human rights 
researchers, specializing in human rights in Myanmar, Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok, (Apr.–Dec. 2013).    
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security grids on Myanmar’s soil.  Whatever the motivations and 
justifications, the apparent failures of the global governance system to help 
end the Rohingya genocide by framing the Rohingya perspective using 
appropriate international legal instruments requires scrutiny.  Part A 
demonstrates that States avoid labeling the Rohingya abuses “genocide” 
for political reasons and Part B describes the importance of invoking the 
term, while Part C calls for U.N. action.  
A.  International Actors and States Avoid the Label “Genocide” for 
Political Purposes 
International academics and prosecutors are not hopeful about 
getting the international justice system activated so that the Rohingya may 
continue to exist as a people in peace. 366  They are not alone.  International 
human rights researchers have not used the term ‘genocide,’ as it would 
trigger a storm of debates where legalese would overwhelm the substance 
of the Rohingya persecution.367  Further, human rights reports using the 
words crimes against humanity or ethnic cleansing, or highlighting the role 
that the central State has played in the so-called communal violence in 
Rakhine State, have been received with open hostility by diplomatic 
missions in Myanmar.368  Even Aung San Suu Kyi, a global icon and 
Myanmar opposition leader who had until recently been viewed as a 
defender of human rights,369 reportedly rejected the use of the term ethnic 
cleansing370 in referring to the plight of the Rohingya.   
The opening up of Myanmar has seen the removal of sanctions, 
increasing investment, and increasing military ties in line with the West’s 
                                                      
366  Interviews with Stephen Heder, London University School of Oriental and African Studies, and 
Andrew Cayley, International Tribunal,  Phonom Penn (Sept. 2013).  In a recent conversation with a 
specialist on the history of the Khmer Rouge, one of the authors was told that until and unless a credible 
practitioner in the field of international human rights law pronounces the plight of the Rohingya as 
genocide, no amount of academic publications in the fields of genocide studies or of law and policy, nor 
of human rights reports will hold tangible results.  Likewise, the last international co-prosecutor, Andrew 
Cayley, who resigned from Cambodia’s U.N.-co-sponsored International Tribunal, also cautioned against 
using the term genocide to characterize the thirty-five year-old process of the Rohingya persecution on 
the basis that Myanmar’s democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi is reportedly ‘not keen on retribution 
against the country’s ruling military leadership and desirous of reconciliation with them.’      
367  Interviews with human rights researchers, Thailand, (May 2013) (names withheld).  
368  Personal experience and communications with a range of human rights activists.  
369  Emanuel Stoakes, Aung San Suu Kyi is turning a blind eye to human rights in the name of 
politics, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 26, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/27/aung-
san-suu-kyi-is-turning-a-blind-eye-to-human-rights-in-the-name-of-politics. 
370  Hanna Hindstrom, Suu Kyi rejects allegations of ethnic cleansing in Burma, DEMOCRATIC 
VOICE OF BURMA (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.dvb.no/news/suu-kyi-rejects-allegations-of-ethnic-
cleansing-in-burma-myanma/33848.  
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economic and geo-strategic plans. 371  Washington’s new policy of 
engagement in its new foreign policy equation, namely the Asian Pivot or 
rebalancing, has come under close scrutiny372 as the Burmese government 
continues to commit atrocities against the Rohingya and does nothing to 
stop popular hate speech and acts against the Muslims of Burma.  Any 
condemnation of violence in Rakhine State by Western governments has 
been overshadowed by praise for the wider reform process in Myanmar 
and attempts to unconditionally embrace the quasi-civilian government of 
that country.373  
In this context, President Thein Sein has been hailed as the “only 
liberal voice,”374 in Myannar and a reformer,375 despite the President’s 
comments to UNHCR in July 2012.  The world has already forgotten that 
Thein Sein himself officially suggested to the U.N. immediately after the 
first recent wave of violence against the Rohingya that the “only solution” 
to the troubles in Rakhine State was either to send stateless Rohingya to 
third countries or to contain them in UNHCR-administered camps.376  
Further, it was the Burmese President who defended publicly the notorious 
Islamaphobic hate-preacher, Buddhist monk Wirathu, as a “son of Lord 
Buddha” with a message of loving kindness.377  The portrayal of the state 
as incompetent or slow in reeling back ultra-nationalists in the face of 
communal violence is diplomatically expedient, but does not absolve the 
Burmese leadership of its fundamental responsibility to protect the people 
under its national jurisdictions.   
 
                                                      
371  See Natalie Brinham, The Conveniently forgotten human rights of the Rohingya, FORCED 
MIGRATION REVIEW 41(Dec. 2012). 
372  See, e.g., Joshua Kurlantzick,  The Moral and Strategic Blindspot in Obama’s Pivot to Asia, 
NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 20, 2012, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/110332/moral-and-strategic-
blindspot-obamas-pivot-asia. 
373  See Brinham, supra note 371. 
374  E-mail from Derrick Mitchell, Ambassador to the United States in Yangon (on file with author).  
375  President Thein Sein was awarded ICG’s “In Pursuit of Peace” award in 2012.  
376  See UNHCR seeks true community reconciliation in Rakhine State, MYANMAR TIMES 
(Jul. 16, 2012), www.mmtimes.com/2012/news/635/news63506.html. Third country is used in that 
context in general discussion of his comments to mean sending Rohingya to refugee receiving countries 
in the west). 
377  See Hanna Hindstrom, Burma president backs anti-Muslim ‘hate preacher’ Wirathu, 
DEMOCRATIC VOICE OF BURMA (June 24 2013),  http://www.dvb.no/news/politics-news/burma-
president-backs-anti-muslim-%E2%80%98hate-preacher%E2%80%99-wirathu/28955; Andrew R.C. 
Marshall, Special Report: Myanmar gives official blessing to anti-Muslim monks, REUTERS (June 27, 
2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/27/us-myanmar-969-specialreportidUSBRE95Q047201 
30627.    
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B.   The History of Abuses and the Political Consequences Require 
Acknowledging the Current Genocide Against the Rohingya  
 
The overwhelming conclusion among experts on the Rohigya 
persecution in Myanmar is that making a case for genocide of the 
Rohingya is a non-starter, pragmatically speaking.378  However, even the 
pragmatic attempt to argue the case of the Rohingya as crimes against 
humanity have for all intents and purposes have not been heard by the  
governments and leaders who are most influential within the UN-led world 
order.379  Human Rights Watch offers the best explanation for international 
inaction: “because [the Rohingya] have no constituency in the West and 
come from a strategic backwater, no one wants them (and no one is 
prepared to help end their decades of persecution) even though the world is 
well aware of their predicament.”380  Despite this, based on the evidence, 
and drawing on the UN Convention on Genocide, the authors argue that 
the Rohingya have been victims of a slow-burning genocide since 1978.   
 A crimes against humanity designation is not sufficient to 
characterize the intent to destroy at the root of the abuses against the 
Rohingya.  While the crimes against humanity framework381 is applicable 
in the abuse of other minority groups in Myanmar over the years, the 
violence against the Rohingya has a unique aspect, in that it aims to 
prevent the Rohingya from existing and is not simply comprised of 
systematic attacks with the intent to cause harm.   
                                                      
378  For instance, Matthew Smith, one of the most prominent experts on the Rohingya persecution 
and the author of Human Rights Watch’s reports on the Rohingya killings in 2012, would choose to stay 
clear of making, even remotely, any suggestion that a decade of Myanmar’s systematic policy of 
population, birth, and marriage control with the Rohingya as the sole targeted ethnic group, may be 
assessed against the Genocide Convention of 1948.  Forced birth control on the basis of a group’s ethnic 
and other identities is considered an act of genocide.  See Press Release, Fortify Rights, Myanmar: 
Abolish abusive restrictions and practies against Rohingya Muslims: Leaked Documents Implicate 
Government Actors in Crimes Against Humanity, (Feb. 25, 2014), available at     
http://www.fortifyrights.org/publication-20140225.html.  Another expert is Benjamin Zawacki, who has 
consistently opted to stay away from any arguments that may trigger a debate as to the Rohingya are, 
empirically speaking, subject to a genocide.  See ZAWACKI, supra note 16.   
379  Authors’ personal communications with some key in-country senior diplomats based in 
Rangoon, officials and politicians from governments and international organizations including the United 
States, UN agencies, ASEAN, EU, and the Organization of Islamic Conference or Cooperation since the 
two bouts of mass violence against the Rohingya took place in June and October 2012.  
380  Perilous Plight: Burma’s Rohingya take to the sea, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 26, 2009), 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2009/05/26/perilous-plight-0. 
381  See, e.g., Life under the Junta: the Evidence of Crimes against Humanity in Burma’s Chin State, 
PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Jan. 2011), http://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-
institutes/center-for-public-health-and-human-rights/_pdf/Burma_Chin_exec_summ_19Jan11.pdf. See 
also, Harvard report calls for Burma inquiry, WORLDLY BOSTON (May 21, 2009),   
http://www.boston.com/news/world/worldly_boston/2009/05/harvard_report_calls_for_ burma.html.  
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Other scholars have acknowledged the possibility of potential 
genocide in the case of the Rohingya.  The authors are convinced by the 
evidence that genocide is demonstrable.  Genocide scholar William 
Schabas,382 who was also one of the first to argue in 2010 the case for 
crimes against humanity in the context of the Rohingya in Western 
Myanmar, cautiously stated: 
 
In the case of the Rohingya we’re moving into a zone where 
the word can be used.  When you see measures preventing 
births, trying to deny the identity of a people, hoping to see 
that they really are eventually—that they no longer exist—
denying their history, denying the legitimacy of their right to 
live where they live, these are all warning signs that mean that 
it’s not frivolous to envisage the use of the term genocide.383 
 
Professor Schabas is correct that there is the intent to destroy, which is in 
and of itself punishable by the Genocide Convention, but the authors’ 
research has shown that slow-burning genocide has been practiced over the 
past thirty-five years.  The very limited openings in Myanmar only now 
have allowed observers and human rights monitors to peak into the 
physically, mentally, and socially devastated world of the Rohingya, 
making it difficult to comprehend the extent of the destruction they have 
already experienced.  In fact, the Rohingya have suffered to a greater or 
lesser degree under similar policies, pogroms and military/civilian 
campaigns since 1978.   
 
C.  Definition of Genocide Requires Action by the United Nations 
 
	   Within the current interstate system reorganized by the U.N., no 
mass atrocities take place in a vacuum.  Here, the role and importance of 
the U. N. ought to be noted.  As the world’s leading organization of global 
governance, the UN’s practices and policies towards the plight of the 
Rohingya need to be scrutinized.   
 Beyond engaging in the humanitarian affairs regarding the Rohingya 
and calling on calling on the Government of Myanmar to recognize them 
                                                      
382  For Schabas’ expert report on the Rohingya, see IRISH CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra 
note 150.  
383  The Hidden Genocide, AL JAZEERA (Dec. 9, 2012), http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/ 
aljazeerainvestigates/2012/12/2012125122215836351.html. 
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as Myanmar citizens, the UN is not doing enough.384  It should thoroughly 
evaluate the role its agencies have played over the years in Myanmar with 
specific regard to the crisis for the Rohingya.  The UNHCR, whose global 
mandate covers the protection of stateless persons as well as refugees and 
internally displaced persons,385 set up operations in North Rakhine State in 
1992, initially to oversee the forced repatriations of the Rohingya from 
Bangladesh.386  Despite their continual presence in North Rakhine State 
and monitoring of the situation there for over twenty years, the UNHCR 
has remained virtually silent as to the human rights abuses to which the 
Rohingya have been subjected. 387   Other agencies, the World Food 
Program for instance, are fully cognizant of the severity of the state 
sponsored and directed persecution of the Rohingya.  In private, officials 
acknowledged the persecution that Rohingya have been experiencing 
amounts to a genocide.388   
The UN should have a public review of the language its agencies use 
to describe the Rohingya crisis.  Language such as communal violence 
which suggests the violence is horizontal, or pandering to the 
Government’s refusal to use words such as Rohingya or stateless, serves to 
further legitimize the role of the State in the violence and divert the 
international community’s attention away from the severity of the 
situation.  Finally, the UN should lead the efforts to establish a U.N.-led 
Inquiry Commission whose task would be to examine the root causes of 
the Rohingya plight over the years, including establishing the roles of both 
the state actors and non-state actors. 
 
                                                      
384 Burma Rejects UN Resolution on Rohingya Muslims, RUETERS, Nov. 21, 2013,  
http://www.voanews.com/content/reu-burma-rejects-un-resolution-on-rohingya-muslims/1794749.html.  
385  Augusta Conchiglia, UNHCR’s Evoling Mandate, LE MONDE (Jun. 2012), http://mondediplo. 
com/2012/06/15unhcr.  
386  C.R. ABRAR, supra note 127. (The author is a Professor in the Department of International 
Relations, University of Dhaka, and Coordinator, Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit).  
387  A famed western critic of international humanitarianism, David Reiff, has published a well-
researched study documenting the gross ineffectiveness, inadequacies, and even complicity of UN-led 
humanitarian organizations including the UNHCR.  Although Reiff’s study did not include the 
UNHCR’s operations in Myanmar, our own in-depth interviews with the Rohingya refugees, former 
humanitarian staff in Myanmar, and other NGO workers with first-hand knowledge of UNHCR’s 
Myanmar operations in Rohingya areas support Reif’s unflattering observations about the UNHCR and 
UN-led humanitarianism.  See DAVID REIFF, A BED FOR THE NIGHT: HUMANITARIANISM IN CRISIS (2002). 
388  Personal communications with former UN local staffers, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (face to face) 
and Rangoon, Burma (via email) (2012-2013).  
JUNE 2014  THE SLOW-BURNING GENOCIDE OF MYANMAR’S ROHINGYA 753 
 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 
“The world is watching and does nothing to end the sufferings of the 
Rohingya.  This is much like what happened in Cambodia and Rwanda.  
The world stands by.  It keeps on watching, watching, watching . . .” states 
Terith Chy, Khmer Criminologist, (Genocide) Documentation Center of 
Cambodia.389 
The authors have concentrated this discussion on Burma’s slow-
burning state-led process of deliberate destruction of the Rohingya as a 
population since 1978.  Of the five acts of genocide spelled out clearly in 
the 1948 Convention on the Punishment and Prevention of the Crime of 
Genocide, four of these acts of genocide have been committed against the 
Rohingya in Western Myanmar in this harrowing process of the past thirty-
five years.  The ruling Burmese, both the Buddhist society and the 
Buddhist state, have committed the first four acts, including intentional 
killing, harm to body and mind of the victims as a group, inflicting on the 
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in 
whole or in part, and preventing births, as defined by the United Nations 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide as 
punishable acts of genocide.  In examining a situation that has been as dire 
and desperate as the Rohingya’s, neither geopolitical considerations nor the 
paralysis of the international justice system and global governance in 
dealing effectively with any mass atrocities around the world should 
prevent scholars from calling a genocide by its real name.  
There is one great irony in sixty years of scholarly and legal debates 
about cases to be recognized as genocide.  Irrespective of how lawyers, 
scholars, diplomats, and politicians may finally decide to characterize the 
plight of the Rohingya, one thing is certain: the nearly one million 
Rohingya trapped inside their own homeland, sandwiched between the 
predominantly Buddhist Myanmar and Muslim Bangladesh, will continue 
to be subject to unspeakable atrocities and systematic rights abuses from 
which thousands of Rohingya have been trying to escape.390  Recognizing 
                                                      
389  Personal communication, on file with the authors, (Nov. 14, 2013).  
390  As the authors were putting the finishing touches to this paper the United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum in Washington just issued an official statement on the plight of the Rohingya 
signaling the magnitude and urgency of the situation.  In a statement issued by USHMM, former US 
Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, who now chairs the Committee on Conscience of the 
US Centre for the Prevention of Genocide, was quoted as saying: “The Museum welcomes recent 
commitments by the Burmese government to assure the security and rights of all people in Burma and 
calls upon the international community to assist Burma in protecting its populations from crimes against 
humanity and ethnic cleansing.”  See Statement on the Situation of the Rohingya In Burma, UNITED 
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the mass atrocities experienced by one-million plus Rohingya and 
committed by both state and non-state actors in Myanmar over the past 
thirty-five years as a slow-burning genocide would be a step towards 
ending it.  The least the world can do is to call genocide what it is: 
genocide.391     
                                                                                                                                                             
STATES HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM (Sept. 24, 2013), http://www.ushmm.org/confront-
genocide/preventing-genocide-blog/genocide-prevention-blog/new-blog-post.  
391  When the co-authors embarked on this collaborative research project some 3 years ago, we were 
unsure of the nature of Myanmar’s acts of discrimination and persecution of more than 1 million 
Rohingya.   But as of the completion of the authors’ final review, not only the two co-authors, but an 
increasing number of credible voices within the global civil society, have realized that Myanmar is 
committing genocide, albeit a slow burning one, against ethnic Rohingya.  See Tin Soe, 33 organizations 
and 33 Global Citizens call to end Rohingya genocide, KALADAN PRESS, Apr. 2014, 
http://www.kaladanpress.org/index.php/news/360-news2014/april-2014/4506-33-organizations-and-33-
global-citizens-call-to-end-rohingya-genocide.html.  For the text of the Call, see Call to End Rohingya 
Genocide, MAUNGZARNI.NET (Apr. 19, 2014) http://www.maungzarni.net/2014/04/call-to-end-rohingya-
genocide-with.html.  
